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Abstract: [201 words] 
Misuse of private information (MPI) governs media privacy disputes in English law.  The second 
VWDJHRIWKLVGRFWULQHLQYROYHVDEDODQFLQJH[HUFLVHFRQGXFWHGEHWZHHQDFODLPDQW¶V$UWLFOHSULYDF\
ULJKW DQG D GHIHQGDQW¶V $UWLFOH  ULJKW WR IUHH H[SUHVVLRQ  Though the starting point is that both 
rights are of equal value, the balancing process entails an inevitable privileging of one right over the 
other (albeit tailored to the specific facts of each case).  This article focuses on this privileging 
process and explores the principles that determine which right will prevail in any given case.  It 
applies the analytical technique of deconstruction propounded by Derrida as employed by American 
critical lawyers.  This technique involves identifying binary oppositions, ascertaining the dominant 
concept and reversing the given hierarchies to reveal their mutual dependence and any potential 
underlying subjectivities.  Deconstructing MPI case law reveals that the balancing of Arts 8 & 10 is 
underpinned E\D IXQGDPHQWDOGLFKRWRP\ WKDWRI WKHµSXEOLF LQWHUHVWYHUVXV LQWHUHVWLQJ WKHSXEOLF¶
This underlying dichotomy is subjected to deconstructive analysis, revealing valuable insights into 
how these terms are deployed for rhetorical purposes by the various parties in MPI disputes, and the 
tensions between liberal ideals and commercial realities that permeate case law. 
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Deconstructing µ3XEOLF,QWHUHVW¶LQthe Article 8 v 10 Balancing Exercise 
 
 
Lies, corruption, phone-hacking, routine privacy intrusion and other legally and/or ethically dubious 
practices; a number of recent parliamentary reports,1 and the high-profile Leveson Report,2 have 
revealed a heart of darkness within parts of the British print media exemplified by, but not restricted 
to, the Murdoch press.  The political response to such failures has been the introduction of a new, 
more effective regime of press regulation,3 reforms that are currently in progress (and by no means 
uncontroversial).  Meanwhile, the courts have been no less active; in addition to dealing with the 
ongoing criminal charges4 and group civil litigation5 generated by illegal phone-hacking activities, 
they have also repeatedly ordered restrictions on select press reportage that is deemed to unjustifiably 
invade individual privacy.  This latter judicial activity is a result of the passage of the Human Rights 
Act 1998, which incorporated the ECHR rights of privacy (Art 8) and free expression (Art 10) into 
English law.  A doctrine termed misuse of private information (MPI), forged by judges from a fusion 
of common law breach of confidence and European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) jurisprudence, 
has subsequently emerged.6   
 
Misuse of private information disputes raise profound questions about the nature of press freedom, the 
innate value of tabloid expression and the wider implications of its associated celebrity culture.  This 
article analyses how the courts have dealt with such issues by undertaking analysis of the interaction 
between the rights of privacy and free expression in MPI caselaw, with particular focus on µSXEOLF
LQWHUHVW¶ the central judicial concept that influences it.  MPI doctrine involves a two-stage test, the 
first limb of which requires the court to determine whether the relevant claimant, usually a high-
SURILOH LQGLYLGXDO KDGD µUHDVRQDEOH H[SHFWDWLRQRISULYDF\¶7  If so, the court undertakes a second 
VWDJH WHVW ZKLFK LQYROYHV EDODQFLQJ WKH FODLPDQW¶V $UW  ULJKW DJDLQVW WKH GHIHQGDQW¶V $UW  ULJKW
                                                          
1
 House of Commons Select Committee for Culture, Media and Sport, News International & Phone Hacking, 
HC 903-I (2010-2012); House of Lords and House of Commons Joint Committee on Privacy and Injunctions, 
Privacy and Injunctions, HC 1443 (2010-2012); House of Commons Select Committee for Culture, Media and 
Sport, Press Standards, Privacy & Libel, HC 362-I (2008-2009). 
2
 /RUG-XVWLFH/HYHVRQµ$Q,QTXLU\LQWRWKH&XOWXUH3UDFWLFHVDQGWKH(WKLFVRIWKH3UHVV5HSRUW¶+&-I to 
HC 780-IV, November 2012). 
3
 Final Draft of Royal Charter on Self-Regulation of the Press (30th October 2013), via 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/249783/Final_Draft_Royal_C
harter_11_Oct_2013.pdf> (accessed 28 March 2014). 
4
 See eg R v Coulson & Others [2013] EWCA Crim 1026.  Seven former employees of the News of the World 
newspaper were subject to criminal charges.  The verdicts for former editors Rebekah Brooks and Andy 
Coulson were reached on 24th June 2014.   
5
 See eg: R (on the application of Bryant & Others) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2011] EWHC 
1314; Phillips v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2012] UKSC 28; Various Claimants v Newsgroup Newspapers 
[2013] EWHC 2119; Gulati & Others v MGN Ltd [2013] EWHC 3392.  
6
 7KLVLVDSURFHVV,KDYHFKDUWHGHOVHZKHUH5HEHFFD0RRVDYLDQµ&KDUWLQJWKH-RXUQH\IURP&RQILGHQFHWRWKH
1HZ0HWKRGRORJ\¶European Intellectual Property Review 2012 34(5) 324-335. 
7
 Murray v Express Newspapers Plc [2008] EWCA Civ 446. 
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based upon the specific facts of the individual case.8  The focus of this article is this second stage 
balancing exercise.  In undertaking analysis of the balancing exercise, this article draws upon 
deconstructive theory.  It provides a brief overview of deconstruction before outlining the legislative 
framework governing the SULYDF\IUHHH[SUHVVLRQµFRQIOLFW¶  It then undertakes detailed examination 
of a crucial maxim recurring across MPI caselaw, namely µZKDWLQWHUHVWVWKHSXEOLFLVQRWQHFHVVDULO\
LQWKHSXEOLFLQWHUHVW¶.  This article provides an analysis of the judicial distinction between expression 
LQWKHµSXEOLFLQWHUHVW¶DQGWKDWZKLFKµLQWHUHVWVWKHSXEOLF¶, employing deconstructive techniques to 
reveal the subterranean tensions that beset this convenient, pithy, yet influential maxim. 
 
 
[1] Deconstruction & law  
 
 
Deconstruction is a technique for reading and interpreting a given text, be it literary, philosophical or 
legal.  Deconstruction does not put forward an overarching theory, political vision or grand narrative,9  
but instead provides a strategy to explore language in texts and scrutinise the logic with which it is 
used, highlighting any innate contradiction, paradox and conflict.10  In this sense it is a technique that 
involves questioning the objective truth claims of various discourses and, arguably, the complacency 
and lack of self-examination such claims may engender.  Deconstruction thus involves a suspicion of 
the definite and, in a political context, an awareness of the contingency and fragility of the concepts 
upon ZKLFKPDQ\RIOLEHUDOLVP¶VFHQWUDOLQVWLWXWLRQVLQFOXGLQJODZDUHEDVHG 
 
µ>7@KHµWUDQVODWLRQ¶RI'HUULGDLQWRODZUHPDLQVDFRQWHQWLRXVLVVXH¶11 and literature in the field is rich 
and varied.12  This article primarily draws upon American literature in deconstruction and law, 
particularly that associated with critical legal studies (cls),13 a tradition concerned with left-leaning 
                                                          
8
 ETK v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 439. 
9
 ³'HFRQVWUXFWLRQDSSHDOVWRQRKLJKHUORJLFDOSULQFLSOHRUVXSHULRUUHDVRQEXW>LQVWHDG@XVHVWKHYHU\SULQFLSOHLW
GHFRQVWUXFWV´-RQDWKDQ&XOOHUOn Deconstruction, 25th Anniversary Edition (London: Routledge, 2008) 87.  
See also, Jonathan Culler, Framing the Sign, Criticism and its Institutions (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988) 
140. 
10
 $&+XWFKLQVRQµ)URP&XOWXUDO&RQVWUXFWLRQWR+LVWRULFDO'HFRQVWUXFWLRQ¶ERRNUHYLHZ Yale 
Law Journal 209, 230. 
11
 Jacques dH 9LOOH µ'HFRQVWUXFWLRQ DQG /DZ 'HUULGD /HYLQDV DQG &RUQHOO¶  9RO  :LQGVRU
Yearbook of Access to Justice 31, 32. 
12
 A full account of wider literature in deconstruction and law is beyond the scope of this article, but see eg: 
Drucilla Cornell, The Philosophy of Limit (London: Routledge, 1992); Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld and 
David Gray Carlson (eds), Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice (London: Routledge, 1992); Jacques 
GH9LOOHµ5HYLVLWLQJ3ODWR¶V3KDUPDF\¶International Journal for the Semiotics of Law 315-335.  
13
 6HH HJ 0DUN 7XVKQHW µ&ULWLFDO /HJDO 6WXGLHV DQG &RQVWLWXWLRQDO /DZ $Q (VVD\ LQ 'HFRQVWUXFWLRQ¶ 
Stanford Law Review   'XQFDQ .HQQHG\ µ(XURSHDQ ,QWURGXFWLRQ )RXU 2EMHFWLRQV¶ LQ 3HWHU
Goodrich, Florian Hoffmann, Michel Rosenfeld, Cornelia Vismann (eds) Derrida and Legal Philosophy 
+DPSVKLUH 3DOJUDYH 0DFPLOODQ  'XQFDQ .HQQHG\ µ$ 6HPLRWLFV RI /HJDO $UJXPHQW¶  
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critique of mainstream liberal legal doctrine.  General features common across cls literature include a 
concern to highlight the fundamentally political character of law, particularly its role in buttressing 
social and economic inequalities, paying particular attention to the innate contradictions and 
indeterminacies that permeate law, as well as its historically and culturally specific nature.14  The 
literature outlined in this part interprets and applies deconstructive ideas to specific legal doctrine, as 
H[HPSOLILHGE\%DONLQ¶VZRUNLQWKLVDUHD15  Such approaches have been criticised for conveniently 
co-RSWLQJ GHFRQVWUXFWLRQ LQWR OHJDO GLVFRXUVH E\ DWWHPSWLQJ WR µIRUPDOL]H DQG GRPHVWLFDWH¶16 it to 
VHUYH DV µMXVW DQRWKHU WHFKQLTXH MXVW DQRWKHU WKHRU\ MXVW DQRWKHU PHWKRG IRUPDNLQJ DUJXPHQWV¶17 
this, for some commentators, is contrary to the fundamentals of the theory18 and strips deconstruction 
of its radical political force.19  Nevertheless Balkin convincingly GHIHQGV WKH µPHWKRGRORJLFDO¶
deconstruction employed by lawyers, maintaining that it serves the needs of legal scholarship more 
effectively.20  The relevant US literature outlined here makes what could otherwise be a somewhat 
marginal, esoteric theory relevant to legal discourse.  It effectively highlights the pertinence of this 
language-based critique to law, a language-based discipline, in a form intuitively comprehensible to 
lawyers.  Thus, rather than adopting a µSXUH¶ deconstructive strategy per se, the approach in this 
article may be viewed as deconstruction-influenced doctrinal analysis in the critical legal studies 
µFOV¶WUDGLWLRQThis part provides a summary of cls-style deconstruction in law as a basis for later 
critique.   
   
Deconstructive readings of texts attempt to draw out the limitations of language, to indicate that a text 
may not represent all that it appears to, or there may be dynamics operating within a text that are at 
odds with what it prima facie seems to state.  For example, there may be subtle but crucial shifts in 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Syracuse Law Review  'XQFDQ .HQQHG\ µ7KH 6WDJHV RI WKH 'HFOLQH RI WKH 3XEOLF3ULYDWH 'LVWLQFWLRQ¶
(1982) 130 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1349.  
14
 See eg, Mark Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1987), 
especially 1-'XQFDQ.HQQHG\	.DUO.ODUH µ$%LEOLRJUDSK\RI&ULWLFDO/HJDO6WXGLHV¶ Yale 
Law Journal 461, 461-462; M.D.A. Freeman, /OR\G¶V,QWURGXFWLRQWR-XULVSUXGHQFH8th edn (London: Sweet 
& Maxwell, 2008), ch 14. 
15
 -0%DONLQµ'HFRQVWUXFWLYH3UDFWLFHDQG/HJDO7KHRU\¶Yale Law Journal 743.  Culler also 
provides an excellent and lucid account in On Deconstruction (n 9). 
16
 3LHUUH 6FKODJ µ7KH 3ROLWLFV RI )RUP DQG WKH 'RPHVWLFDWLRQ RI 'HFRQVWUXFWLRQ¶   Cardozo Law 
Review 1631, 1642. 
17
 ibid 1636 
18
 For Schlag, this is inconsistent with deconstruction, because it leaves intact certain assumptions that 
deconstruction seeks to subvert, namely the privileged, autonomous individual self and linguistic form as a 
neutral vehicle.  ibid. 
19
 ,ELG6HHDOVR3LHUUH6FKODJµ$%ULHI6XUYH\RI'HFRQVWUXFWLRQ¶Cardozo Law Review 741.  See 
also, more generally, De Ville (n 9). 
20
 - 0 %DONLQ µ'HFRQVWUXFWLRQ¶V /HJDO &DUHHU¶   Cardozo Law Review 719.  Here Balkin states 
µWDUJHWHGDQGIRFXVHGXVHVRIGHFRQVWUXFWLRQZHUHPRUHVXFFHVVIXOSUHFLVHO\EHFDXVHGHFRQVWUXFWLRQZRUNVLQ
the interstices of specific texts and specific problems, involving contextual judgments rather than grand 
generalizaWLRQV¶ DW   6HH DOVR - 0 %DONLQ µ1HVWHG 2SSRVLWLRQV¶ %RRN 5HYLHZ   Yale Law 
Journal 1669, 1671.  
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the meanings that underlie certDLQ ZRUGV RU µVLJQV¶ XVHG21  Or it may be revealed that a text 
implicitly relies on hidden rhetorical devices.22  Initially it may seem that a deconstructive approach 
conflicts with mainstream lawyerly understandings of language which arguably strive to achieve 
clarity and certainty by ultimately fixing a single definitive interpretation in any given case.23  Yet, for 
'HUULGD ODZ LV HPLQHQWO\ GHFRQVWUXFWLEOH EHFDXVH µit is founded, constructed on interpretable and 
transformable textual strata¶24  Thus in a legal context, deconstruction will aim to identify blind 
spots, hidden rhetoric and multiple meaning within texts; it will lead one to question accepted, 
mainstream liberal legal concepts by highlighting their unstable, contingent nature. 
 
The aspect of deconstruction perhaps most relevant to law is its identification and analysis of µELQDU\
RSSRVLWLRQV¶.25  These are pairs of concepts which represent opposites and are thus situated in an 
apparently conflicting relationship with one another, for example: man/woman, West/East, 
light/dark.26  Such binary terms are widely accepted as simply reflecting objective reality, or µKRZ
WKLQJVDUH¶, but deconstruction views them as human constructs.  In law binary oppositions frequently 
WDNHWKHIRUPRIDµGLFKRWRP\¶27 and as such they play a fundamental role in legal doctrine as well as 
RWKHUGLVFLSOLQHV )RUH[DPSOH'DOWRQ¶VGHFRQVWUXFWLYHDQDO\VLVRI$PHULFDQFRQWUDFWODZDQDO\VHV
three binary oppositions that underpin caselaw, namely the divides between private/public, 
objective/subjective and form/substance.28  Dalton claims that such oppositions may be reproduced at 
different levels of abstraction.29 
 
According to deconstruction, one of the terms in the binary opposition will be innately privileged:  
 
µIn a traditional philosophical opposition we have not a peaceful co-existence of 
IDFLQJ WHUPVEXWDYLROHQWKLHUDUFK\ 2QHRI WKH WHUPVGRPLQDWHV WKHRWKHU« 
oFFXSLHVWKHFRPPDQGLQJSRVLWLRQ¶30   
                                                          
21
 6HH IRU H[DPSOH µ3ODWR¶V 3KDUPDF\¶ LQ -DFTXHV 'HUULGD Dissemination (Chicago: University of Chicago, 
1981). 
22
 6HHIRUH[DPSOH'HUULGD¶V GLVFXVVLRQRIDQLPDOLPDJHU\LQ+REEHV¶/HYLDWKDQLQThe Beast & the Sovereign, 
Volume I (London: University of Chicago Press, 2009), first session, second session.   
23
 According to Derrida this outlook pervades Western thought generally.  Barbara Johnson, µ,QWURGXFWLRQ¶ LQ
Derrida, (n 21) ix. 
24
 -DFTXHV'HUULGDµ)RUFHRI/DZ7KH³0\VWLFDO)RXQGDWLRQRI$XWKRULW\´¶ Cardozo Law Review 
920, 943. 
25
 Derrida, (n 21) 4.  See also Balkin, Nested Oppositions (n 20). 
26
 µ7KH GXDO RSSRVLWLRQ UHPHG\SRLVRn, good/evil, intelligible/sensible, high/low, mind/matter, life/death, 
LQVLGHRXWVLGHVSHHFKZULWLQJHWF¶Derrida (n 21) 24-25. 
27
 For example, the idea/expression dichotomy in copyright law; Kenrick v Lawrence [1890] 25 QB 99.  Or the 
subjective/objective divide that cuts across many areas of criminal law.  On distinctions within law more 
JHQHUDOO\ VHH 3LHUUH 6FKODJ µ&DQQLEDO 0RYHV $Q (VVD\ RQ WKH 0HWDPRUSKRVHV RI WKH /HJDO 'LVWLQFWLRQ¶
(1988) 40 Stanford Law Review 929. 
28
 &ODUH'DOWRQµ$Q(VVD\LQWKH'HFRQVWUXFWLRQRI&RQWUDFW'RFWULQH¶Yale Law Journal 997. 
29
 ibid, 1003, 1050, 1063.  See also Balkin, Nested Oppositions, (n 20) 1684.  
30
 Derrida quoted by Culler in On Deconstruction (n 9) 85.  See also Derrida (n 21) 5, 24-25.   
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This has potential application in a legal context because legal concepts also arguably rely on an 
XQVSRNHQ SULYLOHJLQJ  )RU H[DPSOH XVLQJ 'DOWRQ¶V H[DPSOHV FRQWUDFW ODZ UHSHDWHGO\ SULYLOHJHs 
private over public, objective over subjective and form over substance.31  Thus, viewed in 
deconstructive terms, law does not necessarily achieve convenient, tidy doctrinal unity, but merely 
implicitly prioritises certain concepts or visions over others.32  The suppressed concept in the binary 
RSSRVLWLRQLVWHUPHGDµGDQJHURXVVXSSOHPHQW¶33  Despite its marginalisation, it is in fact necessary 
because the dominant concept is incomplete or lacking in some way and thus must be supplemented.34  
In this sense the dominant term is reliant upon the subservient and there is an element of 
interchangability between these apparent opposites. 
 
Once a binary opposition has been identified, deconstruction involves a temporary reversal of the 
accepted hierarchy so that the dominant concept becomes the subjugated.35  But such a displacement 
is not concerned with establishing a new hierarchy;36 this would simply reverse the previous dynamic, 
exposing itself to the same criticisms.37  Thus deconstructive reversal of the opposition is only 
temporary ± a transient intellectual exercise.  But this too is valuable because: 
 
µAnalysis of the functiRQLQJRIVXFKRSSRVLWLRQV«LQYROYHVDQLQWHUHVWLQZKDW¶V
at stake in these hierarchizations and an attempt to undo it, showing that the 
system does not live up to its proclaimed principles¶38 
 
This interest in reversal, even if only temporary, highlights GHFRQVWUXFWLRQ¶VQDWXUDODIILQLW\ZLWKWKH
PDUJLQDOLVHGRULWVµDOOLDQFHZLWKWKHXQGHUGRJ¶39) and can be utilised to create opportunities for the 
YRLFHRIµWKHRWKHU¶40 
                                                          
31
 (n 28) 1000, 1040. 
32
 $V5RVHQIHOGVWDWHVµ$ZULWLQJPD\JLYHWKHLPSUHVVLRQRIKDYLQJDFKLHYHGWKHGHVLUHGUHFRQFLOLDWLRQEXW
such impression can only be the product of ideological distortion, suppression of difference or subordination 
RI WKHRWKHU¶ 0LFKHO5RVHQIHOG µ'HFRQVWUXFWLRQDQG/HJDO ,QWHUSUHWDWLRQ&RQIOLFW ,QGHWHUPLQDF\DQG WKH
Temptations of New Legal )RUPDOLVP¶LQ&RUQHOO5RVHQIHOGDQG&DUOVRQQ  
33
 µ:K\LVWKHVXUURJDWHRUVXSSOHPHQWGDQJHURXV",WLVQRWVRWRVSHDNGDQJHURXV LQLWVHOI«$VVRRQDVWKH
VXSSOHPHQWDU\ RXWVLGH LV RSHQHG LWV VWUXFWXUH LPSOLHV WKDW WKH VXSSOHPHQW LWVHOI FDQ EH « UHSODFHG E\ LWV
GRXEOH DQG WKDW D VXSSOHPHQW WR WKH VXSSOHPHQW D VXUURJDWH IRU WKH VXUURJDWH LV SRVVLEOH DQG QHFHVVDU\¶ 
Derrida (n 21) 109. 
34
 For example, Derrida views speech as innately privileged over writing in Western philosophy, but also 
envisages writing as a supplement of speech; ibid, 109-110. 
35
 µ>'@HFRQVWUXFWLRQLQYROYHVDQLQGLVSHQVDEOHSKDVHRIreversal¶ibid 6.   
36
 Balkin (n 15) 770, 786. 
37
 'DYLG-DEEDULµ)URP&ULWLFLVPWR&RQVWUXFWLRQLQ0RGHUQ&ULWLFDO/HJDO7KHRU\¶Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies 507, 510-511. 
38
 Culler, Framing the Sign (n 9) 145. 
39
 Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld and David Gray &DUOVRQµ,QWURGXFWLRQ¶LQQ) ix. 
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The deconstructive process of reversal highlights the mutual reliance of each concept in the 
opposition.  One can only be defined in terms of, or with reference to, the other.  Each concept leaves 
LWV WUDFHXSRQWKHRWKHU  ,Q%DONLQ¶VWHUPV µ:KHQZHKROG an idea in our minds, we hold both the 
LGHD DQG LWV RSSRVLWH¶41  So concepts may prove to be self-subverting, containing contradictory 
aspects or meanings, and these form part of the very structure of discourse.  The conflict between both 
concepts, as commonly understood, is thus revealed as an illusion.42  What results is what Derrida 
WHUPVµA Crisis of versus: these marks can no longer be summed up or ³GHFLGHG´ according to the two 
« binary oppositions¶.43  7KLVPXWXDOUHOLDQFHZKLFK'HUULGDWHUPVµGLIIpUDQFH¶44 means that there 
cannot be a pure, clear distinction between opposing concepts.  For example, Frug deconstructively 
DQDO\VHV IRXU PRGHOV WKDW MXVWLI\ EXUHDXFUDF\ LQ 86 ODZ 'HVSLWH WKH PRGHOV¶ DSSDUHQW FODLPV WR
maintain a clear divide between objective and subjective, Frug identifies the concealed interplay of 
these conflicting elements wLWKLQHDFKPRGHODUJXLQJ WKDWµEvery attempt to separate objective and 
subjective in bureaucratic thought has instead resulted in relentless intermixing of them.¶45  The 
dichotomy is thus flawed; objective and subjective are each a µGDQJHURXVVXSSOHPHQWRIWKHRWKHU¶46 
DQG µZH FDQ QHYHU GUDZ D OLQH EHWZHHQ WKHP¶47  Adopting a similar strategy, Dalton explores the 
circularity of US contract doctrine,48 revealing weak foundations and conceptual inadequacies.49  
Dalton argues that mainstream accounts of US contract law fail to acknowledge fully the 
interdependence of public and private, VWDWLQJ WKDW µOnce these interrHODWLRQVKLSV DUHXQGHUVWRRG«
the public private dichotomy threatens to dissolve¶.50  Ultimately, deconstructing oppositions has the 
effect of destabilising meaning and breaking down clear-cut distinctions between concepts.  In this 
sense the given hierarchy is revealed as contingent and ultimately informed by ideological or other 
values rather than reflecting some natural, universal order.   
 
Deconstruction has the potential to afford illuminating and unconventional insights into the balancing 
exercise because it is constructed around an apparent opposition between privacy and free expression.   
                                                                                                                                                                                    
40
 Deconstruction has generally been adopted as a technique by commentators with a social vision, most 
QRWDEO\ IHPLQLVWVVHHHJ-RDQ:LOOLDPVµ*HQGHU:DUV6HOIOHVV:RPHQLQWKH5HSXEOLFRI&KRLFH¶
66 New York University Law Review 1559; and critical legal scholars, see eg (n 13). 
41
 Balkin (n 15) 753.  See also, Balkin, Nested Oppositions (n 20). 
42
 Johnson (n 23) ix ± x.  
43
 Derrida (n 21) 25. 
44
 'HUULGDGHVFULEHVGLIIpUDQFHDVµD³SURGXFWLYH´FRQIOLFWXDO PRYHPHQW«ZKLFKGLVRUJDQL]HV³KLVWRULFDOO\´
³SUDFWLFDOO\´WH[WXDOO\WKHRSSRVLWLRQRUWKHGLIIHUHQFHWKHVWDWLFGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQRSSRVLQJWHUPV¶ ibid 
6-(OVHZKHUHKHVWDWHVµ'LIIpUDQFH«ZKLFKEULQJVWKHUDGLFDORWKHUQHVVRUWKHDEVROXWHH[teriority of the 
RXWVLGHLQWRUHODWLRQZLWKWKHFORVHGDJRQLVWLFKLHUDUFKLFDOILHOGRISKLORVRSKLFDORSSRVLWLRQV¶ibid 5. 
45
 *HUDOG)UXJµ7KH,GHRORJ\RI%XUHDXFUDF\LQ$PHULFDQ/DZ¶Harvard Law Review 1276, 1289. 
46
 ibid 1288. 
47
 ibid 1291; 1331. 
48
 (n 28) 1066. 
49
 ibid 1023-1024 
50
 ibid 1024.  
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But such techniques also reveal dichotomies present at underlying levels of abstraction in legal 
doctrineWKLVDUWLFOH¶V deconstructive reading of MPI caselaw exposes a more general (but nonetheless 
influential) dichotomy between expressioQ LQ WKH SXEOLF LQWHUHVW DQG H[SUHVVLRQ ZKLFK µPHUHO\¶
interests the public.  Applying deconstructive strategies draws out the underlying assumptions that 
influence these dichotomies and may lead us to question whether the balancing process is as caselaw 
presents, and whether this jurisprudence is as coherent and orderly as it appears.  A natural starting 
point for such inquiry is Articles 8 and 10.  
 
 
[2] The framework: Article 8 µversus¶ 10 
 
 
The crucial balancing stage in MPI doctrine involves a clear binary opposition-like conflict between 
privacy and free expression.51  Indeed there is widespread judicial acknowledgement that Arts 8 and 
10 are in competition with one another,52 though their mutual reliance has also been occasionally 
noted.53  MPI judgments also repeatedly state that Arts 8 and 10 are of equal value, expressly 
H[FOXGLQJWKHSURSRVLWLRQWKDWRQHLVLQQDWHO\SULYLOHJHGµQHLWKHUDUWLFOHKDVas such precedence over 
WKHRWKHU¶54  Thus MPI caselaw expressly rules out the sort of hierarchizing that has been the focus of 
deconstructive strategies in other discourses.  Initially this may appear to limit the relevance and 
potential of deconstruction to this body of caselaw.  Yet the axiom that Arts 8 and 10 are equal is only 
a starting point.  TKHSUDFWLFDOUHDOLWLHVRIOLWLJDWLRQUHTXLUHWKHFRXUWVWRUXOHLQRQHVLGH¶VIDYRXUWKXV
the balancing process inevitably requires either privacy or free expression to be privileged over its 
opponent in a zero-sum fashion (albeit tailored to the specific facts of each individual case and 
category of information).  This prioritisation is facilitated by the construction of the respective 
Articles, each of which sets out the relevant right55 followed by a series of limitations that enable it to 
                                                          
51
 :UDJJUHSHDWHGO\UHIHUVWRWKHµSULYDF\IUHHVSHHFKGLFKRWRP\¶LQµ$)UHHGRPWR&ULWLFLVH"(YDOXDWLQJWKH
Public Interest in Celebrity Gossip after Mosley and Terry¶Journal of Media Law 295-320. 
52
 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [12]; HRH Prince of Wales v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2006] 
EWCA Civ 1776, [45], [73]; A v B (Flitcroft) [2002] EWCA Civ 337, [12]; LNS v Persons Unknown (Terry) 
[2010] EWHC 119, [61]; Axel Springer AG v Germany [2012] ECHR 39954/08, [84], and dissenting opinion 
of Judge Lopez Guerra. 
53
 Campbell (n 52) [55] (Lord Hoffmann); Terry Q>@6HHDOVR&KDUOHV)ULHGµ3ULYDF\¶Yale 
Law Journal 475, 483-)/D5XHµ5HSRUWRIWKH6SHFLDO5DSSRUWHur on the Promotion and Protection of 
WKH5LJKWWR)UHHGRPRI2SLQLRQDQG([SUHVVLRQ¶$SULO81'RF$+5&>@>@ 
54
 Re S (A Child) (Identification: Restrictions on Publication) [2004] UKHL 47, [17] (Lord Steyn).  See also:  
Campbell (n 52) [113] (Lord Hope).  See also Resolution 1165 (1998) Council of Europe Parliamentary 
Assembly as cited in: Flitcroft (n 52) [6]; Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777 [126]; 
Axel Springer (n 52) [50]; Von Hannover v Germany (No 2) [2012] ECHR 40660/08, [71]. 
55
 Article 8(1), Article 10(1) European Convention Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950. 
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be restricted in a broad range of circumstances.56  This structure affords potential scope for the 
privacy right to be limited where freedom of expression is at stake, and vice versa. 
   
Judicial recognition of this mirroring is present in leading cases57 and is epitomised by the following 
statement in Theakstonµ7KHODQJXDJHRI$UWLFOHDQG$UWLFOHHDFKbring in the competing 
rights contained within the other DUWLFOH¶58  Even the proportionality test is framed in mutually-
UHIOHFWLQJWHUPVLQWKDWµWKHSURSRUWLRQDOLW\RILQWHUIHULQJZLWKRQH>ULJKW@KDVWREHEDODQFHGagainst 
WKHSURSRUWLRQDOLW\RIUHVWULFWLQJWKHRWKHU¶59  So throughout MPI caselaw privacy and free expression 
are envisaged as sharing the same fundamental structure, each neatly replicating its opponent in an 
apparently self-contained yin-\DQJ GLFKRWRP\  µ$UWLFOHV  DQG  HQMR\ D UHFLSURFDO VWUXFWXUDO
V\PPHWU\ HDFK FRQWDLQV SRWHQWLDO DOORZDQFH IRU WKH RWKHU¶60  Crucially, the privileging in this 
privacy/free expression binary opposition is reversible, and this relationship is thus ripe for analysis in 
deconstructive terms.  
 
)UXJ¶V findings that key terms in US bureaucratic law tests contain contradictory notions and thus 
merge both opposing sides of a given issue61 are equally applicable to Articles 8 & 10.  According to 
)UXJWKLVµGXDOQDWXUH«JHQHUDWHVWKHWZR-sided character of legal argument, as well as its ultimate 
LQGHWHUPLQDF\  « &RQWUDGLFWRU\ OHJDO DUJXPHQWV FDQ WKXV EH JHQHUDWHG E\ HPSKDVL]LQJ RQH IDFHW
>ZLWKLQDWHUPRUWHVW@DWWKHH[SHQVHRIWKHRWKHU¶62  This account also typifies the nature of opposing 
legal argument in the balancing stage of MPI cases where the subjugation of either privacy or free 
expression is viewed as within the terms of, and indeed consistent with, that very right.  Thus the right 
is not just dominated by its opponent, but also conveniently self-subverting.63  
 
The Art 8/10 framework per se reveals little about the privileging of either right or the broader values 
that influence it.  Free expression, in )LVK¶V WHUPV µLV QRW DQ LQGHSHQGHQW YDOXH¶, has no µµQDWXUDO¶
FRQWHQW¶¶, but constitutes a µSROLWLFDOSUL]H¶IRUSDUWLVDQVWUXJJOH.64  For Fish, 
  
                                                          
56
 Article 8(2), Article 10(2) European Convention Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950.   
57
 The Law Lords in Campbell agreed that each right has the same structure; Campbell (n 52) [105], [139] [140].    
58
 Theakston v MGN Ltd [2002] EWHC 137, [67].  See also: Douglas and others v Hello! Ltd [2001] QB 967 
(CA), [133] (Sedley LJ); Campbell (n 52) [111] (Lord Hope) 
59
 Campbell (n 52) [140] (Baroness Hale); Re S (n 54) [17] (Lord Steyn).   
60
 (n 6) 331. 
61
 (n 45) 1300-1305.  
62
 Wording added.  ibid 1304.   
63
 For example, Tugendhat and Christie indicate that the balancing exercise is to be conducted within Art 10:  
µ+LVWRULFDOO\ WKH(XURSHDQ&RXUWKDVPDGH LW FOHDU WKDWDQ\ ³EDODQFLQJH[HUFLVH´ WKDWKDV WREHFDUULHGRXW
EHWZHHQ WKH ULJKW WR IUHHGRP RI H[SUHVVLRQ DQG WKH JURXQGV IRU LQWHUIHULQJ ZLWK LW XQGHU $UWLFOH «¶
Tugendhat & Christie, The Law of Privacy and the Media (Oxford: Oxford, 2nd ed, 2011) 12.144. 
64
 6WDQOH\)LVKµ7KHUH¶V1R6XFK7KLQJDV)UHH6SHHFKDQG,W¶VD*RRG7KLQJ7RR¶)HEBoston Review, 
3-    6HH DOVR 6WDQOH\ )LVK µ)UDXJKW ZLWK 'HDWK 6NHSWLFLVP 3URJUHVVLYLVP and the First 
$PHQGPHQW¶University of Colorado Law Review 1061, 1062. 
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µ:KHQ WKH )LUVW $PHQGPHQW [right to free speech] is successfully invoked the 
result is not a victory for free speech in the face of a challenge from politics, but a 
political victory won by the party that has managed to wrap its agenda in the 
PDQWOHRIIUHHVSHHFK¶65  
 
Arts 8 & 10, each formulated in manipulable abstract terms, can thus be viewed as generalised 
statements of political ideals that do not have fixed meanings per se.  They require political or social 
argument to be constructed around the privacy/free expression dualism in the form of rights versus 
rights conflicts, but do not provide specific guidance about how such conflicts should be dealt with.  
Instead, Articles 8 & 10 immediately defer potential conflict by delegating the interpretation of 
meaning in any specific context to the judiciary.  Indeed it is only through synthesis with such factual 
FRQWH[WWKDWWKH$UWLFOHV¶YHU\PHDQLQJVDUHSURGXFHG66  This ultimately highlights the perceptiveness 
RI*ULIILWK¶VREVHUYDWLRQ WKDW WKHWH[WRI$UWLFOHµVRXQGV OLNH WKHVWDWHPHQWRIDSROLWLFDOFRQIOLFW
pretending WREHDUHVROXWLRQRILW¶67 
 
Ultimately, the inevitable privileging of either privacy or free expression in MPI must be guided by 
more abstract-level level principles employed by judges.  Deconstructive analysis must therefore be 
undertaken at this level by investigating the emerging body of principles that determine which of the 
two rights will prevail in any given case.  The balancing of Article 8 against Article 10 is guided by 
/RUG 6WH\Q¶V IRXU NH\ SULQFLSOHV68 and, more recently, general criteria set out by the ECtHR69 
including: the FODLPDQW¶VUHQRZQDQGSULRUFRQGXFWWKHVXEMHFWRIWKHUHSRUWand the content, form and 
consequences of the publication.70  But, in essence, the MPI rights-balancing is understood in terms of 
ZKHWKHUWKHSXEOLFLQWHUHVW LQWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VSURSRVHGH[SUHVVLRQRXWZHLJKVWKHFODLPDQW¶VSULYDF\
right.71  Where a media defeQGDQW¶VSURSRVHGSXEOLFDWLRQVHUYHVWKHµSXEOLFLQWHUHVW¶WKHQthe Art 10 
ULJKWZLOOGRPLQDWHRUµRXWZHLJK¶ Art 8.  Yet where the publication does not serve the public interest, 
LQVWHDGµPHUHO\¶ LQWHresting the public, then Art 8 will be privileged.  So tKHµSXEOLF LQWHUHVW¶ LV the 
fundamental animating concept and major underlying determinant of the Art 8/10 privileging process.  
It is to this dichotomy that discussion now turns.   
                                                          
65
 Fish, No Such Thing as Free Speech (n 64) 25. 
66
 One aspect of deconstructive investigation is focus upon how context alters the functioning of language: 
Culler, On Deconstruction (n 9); Culler, Framing the Sign (n 9) 147-8; Balkin (n 15) 780.   
67
 (PSKDVLVDGGHG-$**ULIILWKµ7KH3ROLWLFDO&RQVWLWXWLRQ¶Modern Law Review 1-21, 14. 
68
 Re S (n 54) >@/RUG6WH\Q¶VSULQFLSOHVZHUHGUDZQIURPCampbell (n 52). 
69
 Axel Springer (n 52) [89]-[95]; Von Hannover (No 2) (n 54) [108]-[113].  See also: Von Hannover v Germany 
(No 3) [2013] App 8772/10. 
70
 Axel Springer (n 52) [90]-[95]; Von Hannover (No 2) (n 54) [108]-[113].  Other factors set out in English 
cases have included: whether there was a contractual duty of confidence between the parties (Prince of Wales 
(n 52) [31], [66]-[67]);  WKHFODLPDQW¶VRZQSHUVRQDOLW\ or robustness (Terry (n 52) [127]); the Art 8 rights of 
other family members where evidenced (CDE v MGN [2010] EWHC 3308, [6]-[7]; ETK (n 8) [17]-[18], [19]). 
71
 Browne v Associated News [2007] EWCA Civ 295, [38]. See also: Mosley (n 53) [14]. 
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[3] The underlying dichotomy: public interest µYHUVXV¶ LQWHUHVWLQJ WKH
public  
 
 
In the context of MPI doctrine public interest is conceived as a binary opposition, encapsulated in the 
PD[LPµZKDWLQWHUHVWVWKHSXEOLFLVQRWQHFHVVDULO\LQWKHSXEOLFLQWHUHVW¶72  7KLVµDUJXPHQW-ELWH¶73 is 
recited in numerous major cases74 and LV YLHZHG DV D µNH\ GLVWLQFWLRQ¶ LQ WKH DUHD75  The Leveson 
5HSRUW VWDWHG WKDW µWKH IXQGDPHQWDO GLIIHUHQFH EHWZHHQ WKH SXEOLF LQWHUHVW DQG ZKDW LQWHUHVWV WKH
SXEOLF¶LVDµZHOO-ZRUQ¶SRLQW76  At balancing stage the courts engage in a qualitative assessment of 
WKHGHIHQGDQW¶VSURSRVHGH[SUHVVLRQFDWHJRULVLQJVWRULHVRUIUDJPHQWVRIWKHPDVIDOOLQJZLWKLQRQH
of two categories; either serving a general public interest or merely interesting the public.  Expression 
in the public interest is afforded greater weight in the Art 8/10 balancing process and is thus 
SULYLOHJHG RYHU DQG DERYH LWV µLQWHUHVWLQJ WR WKH SXEOLF¶ FRXQWHUSDUW  <HW WKLV binary opposition, 
ostensibly between socially significant speech and trivial gossip, warrants further deconstructive 
scrutiny.  This part draws out mainstream judicial and academic depictions of both components of the 
dualism in turn, as a basis for subjecting them to deconstructive critique.  Part 4 then examines the 
reasoning employed in caselaw and asks: Are there any respects in which the preferenced concept of 
µSXEOLFLQWHUHVW¶LVUHOLDQWRQWKHµLQWHUHVWLQJWRSXEOLF¶FDWHJRU\LWVXEMXJDWHV"$UHWKHFDWHJRULHVDV
distinct and opposed they are presented?   
 
 
µ3XEOLFLQWHUHVW¶ 
 
The presence of public interest-based elements in the balancing exercise is a cumulative result of its 
origins in breach of confidence,77 the influence of the Press Complaints Commission Code78 and also 
                                                          
72
 This maxim appears to have first been coined by Lord Wilberforce in British Steel Corporation v Granada 
Television Limited³WKHUHLVDZLGHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQZKDWLVLQWHUHVWLQJWRWKHSXEOLFDQGZKDWLWLVLQWKH
SXEOLFLQWHUHVWWRPDNHNQRZQ´>@$&*7KLVZDVODWHUTXRWHGE\6WHSKHQVRQ/-LQ Lion 
Laboratories Limited v Evans [1985] 1 QB 526 (CA), 537B. 
73
 Kennedy, Semiotics of Legal Argument (n 13) 75-76, 80. 
74
 McKennitt v Ash [2006] EWCA Civ 1714, [2008] QB 73, [66]; Prince of Wales (n 52) [51]; Mosley (n 54) 
[114]; ETK (n 8) [23]; Mosley v UK (App. 480009/08) May 2011, ECtHR, [114].  See also:  Privacy and 
Injunctions (n 1) 5. 
75
 Tugendhat & Christie (n 63) 12.95. 
76
 /HYHVRQ5HSRUWQ3W%&K>@7KHGLVWLQFWLRQPD\EHµZHOO-ZRUQ¶EXWLWKDVQRWEHHQVXEMHFWHGWR
detailed scrutiny. 
77
 Lion Laboratories (n 72); A-G v Observer Ltd and others (Spycatcher) [1990] 1 AC 109. 
78
 7KH3&&&RGHVWDWHV WKDW µ7KHSXEOLF LQWHUHVW LQFOXGHVEXW LV QRWFRQILQHG WR L'HWHFWLQJRUH[SRVLQJ
crime or serious impropriety; ii) Protecting public health and safety; iii) Preventing the public from being 
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s.12 HRA.79  The development of MPI caselaw has seen the emergence of three overlapping limbs of 
public interest-based justification.80  Each limb broadly corresponds to particular, though interlinked, 
theoretical justifications for free expression, though these are not explicitly discussed in judgments.   
 
Contribution to democratic debate  
 
The first ground is that publication of information will be in the public interest where it contributes to 
a debate of general interest.  This is viewed as the prevailing rationale employed by the ECtHR,81 and 
the most influential modern justification for free expression generally.82  It is rooted in the proposition 
that free expression is instrumentally essential to foster democratic debate and participation.83   
 
Its influence is present in Campbell where Baroness Hale prioritised political speech due to its 
important role in a democracy, followed by intellectual, educational and artistic speech.  But, in 
FRQWUDVW µWKH SROLWLFDO DQG VRFLDO OLIH RI WKH FRPPXQLW\ DQG WKH « SHUVRQDO GHYHORSPHQW RI
LQGLYLGXDOVDUHQRWREYLRXVO\DVVLVWHGE\SRXULQJ>VLF@RYHUWKHLQWLPDWHGHWDLOVRIDIDVKLRQPRGHO¶V
SULYDWH OLIH¶84  7KH (&W+5 KDV LQGLFDWHG WKDW WKH SXEOLFDWLRQ¶V FRQWULEXWLRQ WR D GHEDWH RI JHQHUDO
LQWHUHVWLVµthe deFLVLYHIDFWRU¶85 DQGDQµHVVHQWLDOFULWHULRQ¶86 in Art 8/10 disputes.  In Von Hannover it 
drew a µfundamental distinction¶ between the reportage of facts which contribute to debate in a 
democratic society (eg about politicians performing their public role) and, on the other hand, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
misled by an action or statement of an individual or organisation.  2. There is a public interest in freedom of 
H[SUHVVLRQ LWVHOI¶  $FFHVVLEOH YLD http://www.pcc.org.uk/assets/696/Code_of_Practice_2012_A4.pdf> 
(accessed 28 March 2014).  This must be considered by the court under HRA 1998, s 12(4)(b).  Note that the 
PCC is to be disbanded in due course. 
79
 HRA 1998, s 12(4)(a)(ii) requires courts to consider the public interest when deciding whether to grant 
interim injunctions. 
80
 7KRXJKQRWH:UDJJ¶VWKUHHDOWHUQDWLYHSXEOLFLQWHUHVWFDWHJRULHVSUHYHQWLQJWKHSXEOLFIURPEHLQJPLVOHG
(2) public figures as role models; (3) freedom of the media to criticise others.  PauO:UDJJµ7KH%HQHILWVRI
Privacy-,QYDGLQJ([SUHVVLRQ¶>@Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 64(2), 187-208, 195. 
81
 *DYLQ3KLOOLSVRQDQG+HOHQ)HQZLFNµ%UHDFKRI&RQILGHQFHDVD3ULYDF\5HPHG\LQWKH+XPDQ5LJKWV$FW
(UD¶Modern Law Review 660-3DXO:UDJJµ0LOO¶V'HDG'RJPDWKH9DOXHRI7UXWKWR
)UHH6SHHFK-XULVSUXGHQFH¶>@Public Law 363-385, 381-2. 
82
  Leveson Report (n 2) Pt B, Ch 2, [3.1], [2.17], [3.7], [4.1]-[4.2].  See also: Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech, 
2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford, 2007) 18.  Though it has recently been subject to question in Miranda v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department & The Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis [2014] EWHC 255, [45]-
[46] (Laws LJ). 
83
 5REHUW%RUN µ1HXWUDO3ULQFLSOHVDQG 6RPH)LUVW$PHQGPHQW3UREOHPV¶ Indiana Law Journal 1; 
$OH[DQGHU0HLNOHMRKQµ7KH)LUVW$PHQGPHQWLVDQ$EVROXWH¶Supreme Court Review 245. 
84
 Campbell (n 52) [148]-[149] (Baroness Hale); [117] (Lord Hope).  See also, Baroness Hale quoted in Donald 
v Ntuli [2010] EWCA Civ 1276, [21]. 
85
 Emphasis added.  Von Hannover v Germany (No 1) [2004] EMLR 21 ECtHR, [76]; [60].  Contribution to a 
GHEDWHRIJHQHUDOLQWHUHVWZDVDOVRVHHQDVDµGHFLVLYHIDFWRU¶LQ Ferdinand v MGN Ltd [2011] EWHC 2454, 
[62]; Rocknroll v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2013] EWHC 24, [30]-[31]; ETK (n 8) [23].  
86
 Axel Springer (n 52) [90]; Von Hannover (No 2) (n 54) [109].  See also: Krone Verlag GmbH v Austria [2012] 
ECHR 33497/07 [48]-[49]. 
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reportage concerning the private lives of individuals who have no official functions.87  The ECtHR 
KDV UHLWHUDWHG WKLV µIXQGDPHQWDO GLVWLQFWLRQ¶ LQ VXEVHTXHQW MXGJPHQWV88  and it similarly influences 
domestic caselaw.  For example, in ETK Ward LJ stated that a proposed News of the World story 
DERXW WKH FODLPDQW¶V H[WUD-marital affair did not contribute to a debate of general interest89 because 
there was 
 
µ1R SROLWLFDO HGJH WR SXEOLFDWLRQ 7KH RUJDQLVDWLRQRI WKH HFRQRPLF VRFLDO DQG
political life of the country so crucial to democracy is not enhanced by publication.  
The intellectual, artistic or personal development of members of society is not 
VWXQWHGE\LJQRUDQFHRIVH[XDOIUROLFVRI>SXEOLFILJXUHV@¶90  
 
However, defendants have successfully used this argument in a number of cases.  In Abbey v Gilligan 
LQIRUPDWLRQ WKDW UDLVHG TXHVWLRQV DERXW WKH SRVVLEOH EOXUULQJ RI /RUG &RH¶V SULYDWH FRPPHUFLDO
interests and public duties prior to the London Olympics was held to contribute to a debate of public 
importance.91  In Goodwin the court allowed publication of the job description of a senior female RBS 
employee who had an affair with Sir Fred Goodwin, its Chief Executive, because this story was 
relevant to the issue of standards in public life.92  The findings in Gilligan and Goodwin epitomise the 
core democratic debate justification.  Bork, a proponent of this argument, claims that democracy is 
UHOLDQWXSRQµRSHQDQGYLJRURXVGHEDWHDERXWRIILFLDOVDQGWKHLUSROLFLHV¶DQGWKXVH[SUHVVLRQGealing 
µH[SOLFLWO\VSHFLILFDOO\DQGGLUHFWO\ZLWKSROLWLFVDQGJRYHUQPHQW¶PXVWEHYLHZHGDVPRUHLPSRUWDQW
than other speech or activities which merely involve gratification of subjective human tastes or 
preferences.93   
 
But the ECtHR has confirmed that the democratic debate ground is not confined to political speech in 
a narrow sense.94  2QHEDVLVIRUDEURDGHUXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIµGHPRFUDWLFGHEDWH¶LV0HLNOHMRKQ¶VZLGHU
interpretation.  Like Bork, he justifies free expression on the basis of its instrumental necessity to 
FLWL]HQV¶ UHVSRQVLELOLWLHV RI GHPRFUDWLF VHOI-government, specifically enabling them to understand 
issues, judge government decisions and assist in wise, effective decision-making.  Meiklejohn claims 
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RURWKHUSHUVRQKROGLQJSXEOLFRIILFH«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VH[XDO UHODWLRQVKLS ZLWK DQ HPSOR\HH LQ WKH VDPHRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶ Goodwin v NGN Ltd [2011] EWHC 1437, 
[132]-[133]. 
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 Bork (n 83) 26-28.  A similar public interest-based argument in relation to officials is advanced by Samuel 
:DUUHQDQG/RXLV%UDQGHLVLQµ7KH5LJKWWR3ULYDF\¶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Harvard Law Review 193, 214-6. 
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 Axel Springer (n 52) [90]; Von Hannover (No 2) (n 54) [109]. 
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WKDW µ6HOI-government can exist only insofar as the voters acquire the intelligence, integrity, 
sensitivity, and generous devotion to welfare that, in theoryFDVWLQJDEDOORWLVDVVXPHGWRH[SUHVV¶95  
$VD UHVXOW KHYLHZV WKHH[SUHVVLRQ WKDW DLGVFLWL]HQV¶ UROHV WR HQFRPSDVV HGXFDWLRQDO DUWLVtic and 
scientific expression.96  An alternative, though less influential justification, individual self-
development,97 justifies yet broader protection for expression that informs non-political debate.  
Redish, for example, claims that all free expression rationales, including democratic process, are 
ultimately reducible to this core justification.98  He argues that individual self-realisation, which 
includes self-governance and the development of individual faculties,99 is not restricted to the political 
realm.100  Instead individual self-development extends to foster private life choices which are a matter 
for the individual.101  ,Q VLPLODU WHUPV 3HUU\ DGYRFDWHV DQ µHSLVWHPLF¶ IUHH H[SUHVVLRQ MXVWLILFDWLRQ
based on the cultivation of oQH¶VHVVHQWLDOKXPDQFDSDFLWLHV102 which entails protection for expression 
that aids personal choices.  3HUU\TXHVWLRQVWKHGHPRFUDWLFMXVWLILFDWLRQ¶VDVVXPHGGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQ
DQLQGLYLGXDO¶VSROLWLFDODQGSHUVRQDOFKRLFHVDQGWKXVWKHH[SUHVVLRQnecessary to inform each).  For 
3HUU\ERWKDUHXOWLPDWHO\LQIRUPHGE\DSHUVRQ¶VPRUDO-political vision so there is no reason to value 
one more than the other.103  These justifications indicate that valued expression should logically 
extend beyond the political to that which stimulates wider social or moral debate and, as such, they 
suggest a broader rendering of public interest. 
 
Spelman v Express104 provides an apt example of this broader understanding of debate.  Though the 
Spelman story did not involve strLFWO\SROLWLFDOLVVXHVQRWZLWKVWDQGLQJWKHFODLPDQW¶V&DELQHWPLQLVWHU
PRWKHU WKH ZLGHU VRFLDO LVVXHV LW WDSSHG LQWR QDPHO\ VFKRROV¶ GXWLHV WR SXSLOV DQG SUHVVXUHV RQ
children in high-OHYHO VSRUWV TXDOLILHG LW DV OHJLWLPDWH µSXEOLF GHEDWH¶ LQ WKH FRXUW¶V YLHZ105  In 
McClaren a similarly broader approach was taken.  Here the court permitted publication of the former 
(QJODQGPDQDJHU¶VH[WUD-PDULWDODIIDLURQ WKHEDVLV WKDWKHZDVDµSXEOLF ILJXUH¶DQG WKHGHIHQGDQW
WKXVKDGDµOHJLWLPDWHLQWHUHVW¶LQSXEOication.  The court cited comments from Terry in support of its 
GHFLVLRQFODLPLQJWKDWµIUHHGRPWRFULWLFLVH¶WKHEHKDYLRXURIRWKHUVLVDYDOXDEOHIUHHGRPDQGµDVD
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UHVXOWRISXEOLFGLVFXVVLRQDQGGHEDWH«SXEOLFRSLQLRQGHYHORSV¶106  Though there has been support 
for maintaining a narrow political understanding of expression that fosters debate in the public 
interest,107 the cases outlined here highlight the problematic nature of neatly partitioning disputed 
H[SUHVVLRQDVSHUWDLQLQJWRWKHµSROLWLFDO¶µVRFLDO¶RUµPRUDO¶0RVWGLVSXWHGVWRULHVZLOOLQYROYHDOO
three dimensions to varying degrees, making the dichotomous choice of situating a specific 
SXEOLFDWLRQRUIUDJPHQWRILWZLWKLQRUEH\RQGWKHµSXEOLFLQWHUHVW¶FDWHJRU\D somewhat crude one. 
 
Preventing the public from being misled 
 
The second form of public interest expression is that which reveals that the public has been misled 
and/or highlights hypocrisy.108  In such circumstances, according to Eady J, the court must DVNµZRXOG
publication in some way prevent the public from being seriously PLVOHG"¶109  Or is the intrusion of 
SXEOLFDWLRQQHFHVVDU\DQGSURSRUWLRQDWHµWRSUHYHQWWKHSXEOLFIURPEHLQJsignificantly misled by [the 
FODLPDQW¶V@SXEOLFFODLPV¶110 
 
This justification was illustrated in Campbell where the claimant accepted that her false claims to be 
drug-free justified the defendants setting the record straight, albeit shorn of unnecessary detail.111  
6LPLODUO\ 5LR )HUGLQDQG¶V VHOI-depiction as a reformed, mature family man justified the Sunday 
0LUURU¶V SXEOLFDWLRQ RI D VWRU\ DQG FRUURERUDWLQJ SKRWR RI KLV DGXOWHURXV DIIDLU112  Here Nicol J 
claimed that this form of public interest argument is ultimately premised upon the importance of 
revealing truth.113  This proposition is supported more generally by the ECtHR guidance in Axel 
Springer which confirms that the veracity of the disputed information is a relevant criterion in the 
balancing exercise.114  It thus corresponds to one of the fundamental justifications for free expression, 
rooted in -RKQ6WXDUW0LOO¶VOn Liberty thesis, that the free exchange of ideas ultimately furthers the 
discovery of truth.115  <HW 0LOO¶V DUJXPHQW DSSOLHG DOPRVW LQGLVFULPLQDWHO\ WR D ZLGH UDQJH RI
expression, even (counter-intuitively) that which was false116 RURIµORZTXDOLW\¶.117  This is because 
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for Mill, truth was just part of the issue; as Wragg explains, his main concern was how individuals 
hold their truths.118  Mill repeatedly and eloquently stressed the importance of debate and interaction 
with opposing views so that truths could be actively tested, properly understood and rationally held 
rather than being passively UHFHLYHG µHQFUXVWLQJ DQG SHWULI\LQJ >WKH PLnd] against all other 
LQIOXHQFHV¶119  So the truth justification for free expression does not precisely fit with the narrower 
misleading the public ground.  In Mosley Eady J expressly stated that this rationale could not justify 
all factual publications in any circumstances.120  Thus, like the democratic debate rationale, the truth 
justification rests to some extent on the inherent benefits of individual engagement in debate, dialectic 
and intellectual interaction.  Indeed the two justifications are viewed as inherently linked.121 
 
Revealing crime or serious misdeeds 
 
The final public interest-based argument used by defendants is that the proposed publication reveals 
serious misdeed or criminal conduct.122  ,QGRLQJ VR WKH UHOHYDQW VSHHFKVHUYHV D µOHJLWLmate social 
SXUSRVH¶123  This ground is aptly illustrated in Browne ZKHUH WKH&RXUWRI$SSHDOXSKHOG(DG\-¶V
judgment allowing publication of select informatLRQIURPDIRUPHUSDUWQHURI%3¶V&KLHI([HFXWLYH 
which revealed that the latter had improperly put company resources to personal use.124  The ground 
was also considered in Hutcheson v News Group.  When considering whether to grant an interim 
injunction in this case, WKH&RXUWRI$SSHDOKHOGWKDWWKHGHIHQGDQWKDGµVWURQJ¶DQGµSRZHUIXO¶SXblic 
interest justifications to publish the IDFW WKDW WKH FODLPDQW KDG D VHFRQG IDPLO\ µWR DXWKHQWLFDWH WKH
DOOHJDWLRQRIGLYHUVLRQRIFRUSRUDWH IXQGV IRUSULYDWHSXUSRVHV¶125  Otherwise there was a risk of a 
distorted, partial picture to public.126  This third public interest ground is broadly based upon a 
combination of the truth and democratic debate justifications already discussed.  By their very nature, 
crime and corruption will invariably involve deceit or surreptitious activity, and thus revealing such 
activity will disclose the true position to the wider public.  Furthermore, this ground serves general 
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democratic ideals by fostering accountability.127  Fenwick and Phillipson confirm that the democracy 
MXVWLILFDWLRQµHQFRPSDVVHVWKHIXQFWLRQZKLFKDIUHHSUHVVSHUIRUPVLQH[SRVLQJDEXVHVRISRZHU¶128 
 
7KHPHGLDLQµSXEOLFLQWHUHVW¶ 
 
7KHPHGLD LVDVFULEHGDYLWDODQGVSHFLILF UROHZLWKLQ WKHFRQFHSWRISXEOLF LQWHUHVW WKDWRI µSXEOLF
ZDWFKGRJ¶ 7KLVDSSHDOLQJPHWDSKRUKDVEHHQDGRSWHGE\ the House of Lords129 and ECtHR,130 as 
well as the Leveson Report which stated that µD IUHH SUHVV VHUYHV WKH LQWHUHVWV RI GHPRFUDF\ «
through its public watchdog role, acting as a check on political and other holders of power¶131  The 
watchdog trope has a discernible rhetorical effect; it casts the media as observer, scrutiniser and also 
guardian, protector of the public.  $VµZDWFKGRJ¶LWVIXQFWLRQLVWRDOHUWZDUQDQGLQIRUPWKHSXEOLFLW
is charged with protecting.132  7KH PHGLD¶V paternalist role is also apparent, for example, in 
&KXUFKLOO¶V URPDQWLFLVHGGHSLFWLRQVRI WKHSUHVVDV µXQVOHHSLQJJXDUGLDQ¶DQG µYLJLODQWJXDUGLDQ¶133 
DQGLQ0LOO¶VFODLPWKDWLWSURYLGHVµVHFXULW\¶DJDLQVWµFRUUXSWRUW\UDQQLFDOJRYHUQPHQW¶134  All are 
consistent with the enduring ideal of the PHGLDDVDQREOHµIRXUWKHVWDWH¶7KHYDULRXVZD\VLQZKLFK
the media fulfils its protective watchdog role are elaborated in the following influential passage by Sir 
John Donaldson MR quoted in recent MPI caselaw:135 
 
µ7KHPHGLD«DUHDQHVVHQWLDOIRXQGDWLRn of any democracy.  In exposing crime, 
anti-social behaviour and hypocrisy and in campaigning for reform and 
propagating the view of minorities they perform an invaluable function¶136  
 
Here the media are portrayed as a progressive force, as defenders of the marginalised and 
downtrodden.  Interestingly, this passage also features a second salient metaphor: the media as a 
µIRXQGDWLRQ¶RIGHPRFUDF\  The Court of Appeal in ETK used similar imagery, claiming the media 
forms a µSRZHUIXOSLOODURIGHPRFUDF\¶137  Implicit in such metaphors is that without this pillar or 
foundation, democracy would significantly weaken or even collapse.        
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The highly idealised status as upholders of truth and democratic values is limited to the press in its 
capacity of reporting on matters of public interest of the types discussed.  The ECtHR has expressly 
stated that the media only XQGHUWDNHV LWV µwatchGRJ¶ UROH LQ WKLV FRQWH[W138  The weight of press 
expression is conditional on the extent to which its reportage serves this abstract public interest-
watchdog function.  Courts have thus repeatedly expressed concern to ensure such journalism will not 
be inhibited by the principles they are fashioning.139   
 
These passages indicate, and commentators agree, that media freedom of expression is of instrumental 
value, to be judged by the benefits it brings to the public.140  The press watchdog role is deemed a duty 
EDVHGXSRQWKHSXEOLF¶Vright to receive information.141  So WKHµLQWHUHVW¶RIWKHSXEOLFLQWKLVFRQWH[W
is a sort of stake or right, and this is arguably attributable to the dominant influence of democracy and 
truth justifications that underpin free expression in this area.142  6XFKLVWKHSXEOLF¶Vstake here, that 
some have proposed that judicial assessments in MPI should be more public-centred.   Tugendhat & 
Christie suggest WKDWµit would aid the clarity and quality of decision-PDNLQJ LI WKHSXEOLF¶V ULJKW WR
know were expressly considered as a matter of course¶,143  though the courts have occasionally 
considered general public interest issues independently of media defendantV¶ OHJDO DUJXPHQWV144  
Phillipson has also argued that where rights conflict, courts µPXVWDVVHVVWKHIUHHVSHHFKVLGHRIWKH
equation only by reference to instrumental, audience-EDVHGMXVWLILFDWLRQV¶145  
 
 
µ,QWHUHVWLQJWRWKHSXEOLF¶ 
 
µ:KDWLQWHUHVWVWKHSXEOLF¶LVWKHDOWHUQDWLYHFDWHJRU\WKDWIHDWXUHVin MPI judgments, representing the 
counterpart or opposite of public interest, particularly in its democratic debate form.  In Rocknroll v 
News Group WKH FRXUW FDVW WKH VSHHFK µKLHUDUFK\¶ DV D GXDOLVW µVSHFWUXP¶ ZLWK FRQWULEXWLRQ WR
GHPRFUDWLF GHEDWH µDW RQH HQG¶ DQG PDWHULDO YLHZHG DV LQWHUHVWLQJ WKH SXEOLF µDW WKH RWKHU HQG¶146  
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Briggs J referred to WKHVHDVµWZRFDWHJRULHV¶147 reinforcing the nature of the dichotomy.  Within this 
ELQDU\ RSSRVLWLRQ µLQWHUHVWLQJ WR WKH SXEOLF¶ LV WKH VXEMXJDWHG concept; µLW LV not enough for 
LQIRUPDWLRQWREHLQWHUHVWLQJWRSXEOLF¶148  As a result, judges have limited concern with this category.  
In Goodwin, Tugendhat - FODLPHG WKDW WKRXJK MXGJHV KDYH WKH µILQDO VD\¶ RQ ZKDW FRQVWLWXWHV WKH
SXEOLF LQWHUHVW QHZVSDSHU HGLWRUV KDYH ILQDO VD\ RQ ZKDW LV µLQWHUHVWLQJ WR WKH SXEOLF¶ WKXV
demarcating their respective domains.149  Yet it is highly illuminating to survey judicial approaches to 
expression they categorise as falling short of the public interest benchmark.   
 
µ,QWHUHVWLQJ¶ 
 
7KH ILUVW SRLQW WR QRWH LQ WKH GLFKRWRP\ LV WKH VKLIW IURP µinterest¶ LQ the privileged concept to 
µinteresting¶This shift represents a move away IURPµLQWHUHVW¶DVDQRUPDWLYHWHUP with connotations 
RIWKHSXEOLF¶VUight or stake in the expression.  In this new context it becomes a descriptive term to 
designate information that entertains or DWWUDFWV WKH SXEOLF¶V attention,150 and thus, implicitly, 
something less important. 
 
As discussed in Part 3.1, the distinction between public interest and non-public interest expression is 
present in leading cases such as Campbell151 and Von Hannover.152  In other cases the dichotomy has 
been couched in more explicit terms.  The court in CC v AB, drawing on Campbell, VWDWHGµthere are 
GLIIHUHQWFDWHJRULHVRI µVSHHFK¶ WRZKLFKJUHDWHURU OHVVHU importance may be attached (eg what has 
been FDOOHG ³SROLWLFDO VSHHFK´ versus ³YDSLG WLWWOH-WDWWOH´)¶.153  Similarly, in Mosley the court stated 
that µ³SROLWLFDO VSHHFK´ would be accordeG JUHDWHU YDOXH WKDQ JRVVLS RU ³WLWWOH WDWWOH´¶.154  Judicial 
categorisation of certain expression as trivial tittle-tattle shows a clear (and arguably justifiable) 
circumspection towards such reportage.  This disdain is particularly apparent in Mosley where Eady J 
KDG µOLWWOH GLIILFXOW\¶ LQ FRQFOXGLQJ WKHUH ZDV QR legitimate public interest in video footage of the 
claimant engaging in private sado-masochistic sexual activities; µThe only reason these pictures are of 
interest is because they are mildly salacious and an opportunity to snigger¶.155  He went on to say that 
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µTitillation for its own sake could never be justified.  Yet it led many thousands of people to see the 
footage¶.156  Elsewhere judges dismissed similar types of reportage involving revelations about private 
VH[XDOFRQGXFWDVµWDZGU\DOOHJDWLRQV¶157 µYDSLGWLWWOHWDWWOH¶158 µVDODFLRXV¶159 DQGµVDWLVI\>LQJ@SXEOLF
pUXULHQFH¶160  Such characterisations are perhaps a natural consequence of the nature of reportage 
disputed in the vast majority of MPI cases, most of which is µkiss and tell¶ (or rather, µkiss and sell¶).   
 
Despite operating as a dichotomy WKHFDWHJRULHVRIµSXEOLFLQWHUHVW¶DQGµLQWHUHVWLQJWRWKHSXEOLF¶are 
not mutually exclusive.  There is judicial acknowledgement that stories in the public interest may also 
interest the public.  The point is illustrated by reference to the 1960s Profumo affair which, according 
to the following passages, involved public interest issues and a titillating sexual element:  
 
 µI have little doubt that sexual relationships involving those who are in the public 
H\H « DUH JHQHUDOO\ OLNHO\ WR EH LQWHUHVWLQJ WR Whe public, but they will not 
necessarily be of genuine public interest.  Sometimes, as for example long ago in 
WKHFDVHRIWKHµ3URIXPRVFDQGDO¶WKHLQIRUPDWLRQZLOOIXOILOERWKFULWHULD¶161 
 
µ« ZKHWKHU publication is sought to genuinely inform public debate, or rather 
merely to titillate the undoubted interest of a section of the public in the sexual or 
other private peccadillos of prominent persons.  The two categories are not 
necessarily exclusive, as the Profumo scandal vividly illustrates¶162 
 
A marked assumption underlying these passages is that only matters of a lurid sexual nature will or 
can interest the public.   
 
7KH PHGLD UROH LQ µLQWHUHVWLQJ WR WKH SXEOLF¶ FDQ EH LOOXPLQDWLQJO\ FRQWUDVWHG ZLWK LWV idealised 
watchdog function in the public interest context.  In this role the press are purveyors of trivia and 
scandal that serves no useful social function and has no (or very limited) qualitative value.  Such 
coverage has been criticised as µPseudo public interest journalism [which] discredits the genuine 
article, is not assessable by its audiences and damages the reputation of the media¶163  Yet such 
criticisms can be traced back to :DUUHQ DQG %UDQGHLV¶ VHPLQDO 1890 article which advocated the 
creation of a privacy right to protect individuals from then emerging developments in the media.  
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Here, the authors made numerous emotive and openly rhetorical claims about the tabloid-style 
reportage of the day.  They accused WKHSUHVVRIµRYHUVWHSSLQJ«ERXQGVRISURSULHW\ DQGGHFHQF\¶
and acting ZLWK µHIIURQWHU\¶  7KH JRVVLS WKH\ published was deemed µXQVHHPO\¶ DQ µHYLO¶ ZKLFK
µboth belittles DQG SHUYHUWV¶ and which ultimately leads to µORZHULQJ RI VRFLDO VWDQGDUGV DQG RI
PRUDOLW\¶In summary, they argued, µTriviality destroys at once robustness of thought and delicacy of 
feeling.  No enthusiasm can flourish, no generous impulse can survive under its blighting 
influence¶164  These various depictions brinJ WR PLQG WKH µSUROH-IHHG¶ F\QLFDOO\ SURGXFHG E\ WKH
Ministry of Truth to placate, distract and manipulate the populace LQ2UZHOO¶VSUHVFLHQWG\VWRSLD165 
 
,QIRUPDWLRQ µLQWHUHVWLQJ WR WKH SXEOLF¶ is deemed entertaining rather than empowering, entirely 
inconsequential, or even pernicious.  For this reason, trivia or tittle-tattle ± WKDW ZKLFK LV µPHUHO\¶
interesting to the public ± has low value in the balancing process.  7KLVLVUHIOHFWHGLQWKH(&W+5¶V 
comments in Mosley that µDifferent considerations apply to press reports [regarding] sensational and, 
at times, lurid news, intended to titillate and entertain¶.166  It confirmed that where disputed expression 
is for entertainment rather than (eg) educational purposes,167 the Article 10 right is given a narrower 
interpretation.  As a result, Art 8 will rarely yield in priority to the Art 10 right to freely express tittle-
tattle.168  Yet, as the individual self-development justifications outlined at Part 3.1 demonstrate, the 
general distinction between the innate value of political and non-political (eg, entertaining) expression 
is by no means settled.  This was acknowledged by the German Constitutional Court in Von Hannover 
(No 1).  It noted the merger of reportage and entertainment, cautioning that it should not be 
µXQLODWHUDOO\ SUHVXPH>HG@ WKDW HQWHUWDLQPHQW PHUHO\ VDWLVILHV D GHVLUH IRU DPXVHPHQW UHOD[DWLRQ
HVFDSLVPRUGLYHUVLRQ¶, but that it may also fulfil important social functions, for example by sparking 
discussion of issues, values and life philosophies.169  It thus rejected a strict dichotomous 
categorisation of expression, stating:   
 
µ7KH IRUPDWLRQVRIRSLQLRQV DQGHQWHUWDLQPHQWDUH not opposites.  Entertainment 
also plays a role in the formation of opinions.  It can sometimes even stimulate or 
LQIOXHQFHWKHIRUPDWLRQRIRSLQLRQVPRUHWKDQSXUHO\IDFWXDOLQIRUPDWLRQ¶170 
 
                                                          
164
 (n 93) 196. 
165
 2UZHOO GHVFULEHG µSUROH-IHHG¶ DV µSUROHWDULDQ OLWHUDWXUH PXVLF GUDPD DQG HQWHUWDLQPHQW JHQHUDOO\  «
rubbishy newspapers containing almost nothing except sport, crime and astrology, sensational five-cent 
novelettes, films oozing with sex, and sentimental songs which were composed entirely by mechanical 
PHDQV¶George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (London: Penguin, 1990) 46. 
166
 (n 74) [114].  Later cited in Rocknroll (n 85) [30].  See also: Ferdinand (n 85) [62]. 
167
 ibid [131]. 
168
 Giggs (n 109) [33]. 
169
 Recited by the ECtHR in Von Hannover (No 1) (n 85) [25]. 
170
 Emphasis added.  ibid. 
22 
 
This provides further indication that the distinctions underpinning the public interest/interesting the 
public divide are constructed and contestable.  Indeed even the negligible worth of trivia and gossip 
cannot necessarily be automatically assumed, and its select redeeming qualities have been noted.171   
 
µ3XEOLF¶ 
 
Some notable points UHJDUGLQJWKHµSXEOLF¶LQWKLVVHFRQGFDWHJRU\DOVRbecome apparent upon further 
examination.  A salient starting point is :DUUHQ	%UDQGHLV¶account of the trivia-reading public who 
the authors depict in a manner similar to the trivia they deplore.  For example, they claim that such 
gossip VDWLVILHVµDSUXULHQWWDVWH¶µRFFXS>LHV@WKHLQGROHQW¶DSSHDOVWRKXPDQZHDNQHVVDQGPLVOHDGV
WKHµLJQRUDQWDQGWKRXJKWOHVV¶.172  It is difficult not to see such generalisations as silently influenced 
by a sort of elitist condescension of, or distaste for, WKHµPDVVHV¶.173 
 
One must also note recurring MXGLFLDOFRPPHQWVUHJDUGLQJWKHµSXEOLF¶LQWKLVFRQWH[W)Rr example, 
in Von Hannover, the ECtHR concluded that the sole purpose of the disputed photographs and 
accompanying reportage was WRµVDWLVI\WKHFXULRVLW\RIa particular UHDGHUVKLS¶174  It made similar 
comments in Mosley, referring to sensational µSUHVV UHSRUWV « ZKLFK DUH DLPHG DW satisfying the 
curiosity of a particular UHDGHUVKLS¶175  Similarly, in OPQ the court dismissed the social value of 
µSXEOLFDWLRQVZKRVHVROHDLPLVWRVDWLVI\FXULRVLW\RIa certain public¶176  More recently Briggs J in 
Rocknroll described publications intenGHGµmerely to titillate the undoubted interest of a section of the 
public.¶177  Cumulatively, these comments indicate that this µSXEOLF¶HVVHQWLDOO\FRPSULVHGRIWDEORLG
consumers, is not representative.  It forms a select social group; a group narrower than the broad, 
FLYLFLGHDOWRWDOLW\UHSUHVHQWHGLQµSXEOLFLQWHUHVW¶,QWKLVFRQWH[WWKHWHUPµSXEOLF¶VKLIWVLQPHDQLQJ
from its use in public interest proper.  The logical effect of this shift is to marginalise or underplay 
this group in size, significance and voice; it implies that this group is a niche demographic and 
FHUWDLQO\QRWUHSUHVHQWDWLYHRIWKHZLGHUµSXEOLF¶WKXV discreetly justifying judicial subjugation of the 
µLQWHUHVWLQJWRWKHSXEOLF¶FDWHJRU\ 
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Further revealing comments about the public in this category feature in the Leveson Report.  In the 
course of evidence, proprietor of the Express Group, Richard Desmond, claimed simply to be giving 
WKHSXEOLFµwhat they want to read and watch¶HVVHQWLDOO\ZKDWLQWHUHVWVWKHP178  Leveson found that 
a number of the newspaper editors who gave evidence179 KHOGµa conception of the public interest that 
was essentially defined by what interested the readership¶180  These witnesses justified their exposés 
in terms of the public interest, but when asked to elaborate on their understandings of the term, 
GHILQHGLWZLWKUHIHUHQFHWRWKHUHDGHUGHPDQGWKLVSXEOLFLVµWKHFRQVXPHU¶ µWKHPDUNHW¶6RZKDW
LQWHUHVWVWKHSXEOLFRUHGLWRUV¶SHUFHSWLRQVRILWVWURQJO\LQIOXHQFHGWKHHGLWRUV¶YLHZVRIZKHWKHUD
publication was in the public interest.181  This led Leveson to find 
 
µthere has been, within parts of the press, a conflation of the public interest with 
what interests the public, such that individual dignity and privacy is ignored to 
satisfy the demands of a readership¶182 
 
Leveson also concluded that press mechanisms for considering wider public interest issues before 
publication of potentially intrusive stories were inadequate.183  Such findings lend support to 
7XJHQGKDW-¶VDUJXPHQWWKDWGHWHUPLQLQJthe public interest must be the job of judges, not editors.184  
Editors confuse, overlap or fail to properly distinguish between public interest and interesting the 
public, whereas judges do not.185  
 
&RPPHUFLDODVSHFWRIµLQWHUHVWLQJWKHSXEOLF¶ 
 
2QHFUXFLDODVSHFWRIµLQWHUHVWLQJWKHSXEOLF¶LVLWVLPSOLFLWDVVRFLDWLRQZLWKWKHFRPPHUFLDOFRQWH[WLQ
which newspapers operate.  Newspapers are commercial enterprises in a liberal free market system 
and must be profitable to exist.  They are subject to general commercial imperatives, particularly the 
need to integrate into the market by meeting the demands of shareholders and directors, and to attract 
advertising revenues.186  To maintain vital profits, newspapers must maintain their readership by 
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producing content that is appealing and even entertaining  ,Q VKRUW QHZVSDSHUV¶ FRPPHUFLDO VDOHV
rely directly upon their ability to interest the public.  These commercial realities are acknowledged 
across MPI caselaw and wider literature. 
 
 The current commercial pressures on British newspapers were discussed in the Leveson Report.187  
Leveson highlighted the challenges of internet-based competition to traditional newspapers, 
particularly when the latter must continue to meet the financial costs of producing news.188  It also 
FRQILUPHGµVLJQLILFDQW¶GHFOLQHVLQQHZVSDSHUVDOHVVLQFH189  The commercial challenges facing 
the newspaper industry are also acknowledged as a sort of background fact in certain MPI cases.  For 
example, in Campbell Baroness Hale claimed: 
 
µOne reason why press freedom is so important is that we need newspapers to sell 
in order to ensure that we still have newspapers at DOO¶190  
 
7KHDVVXPSWLRQXQGHUO\LQJWKLVVWDWHPHQWLVWKDWQHZVSDSHUVRIDOONLQGVDUHµJRRG¶7KH\PXVWVHOO
FRSLHVWRHQVXUHWKHLUFRQWLQXHGH[LVWHQFHWKXVPDLQWDLQLQJWKLVµJRRG¶191  This rationale was echoed 
by the Court of Appeal in ETK.  Though it granted an interim injunction to prevent publication of the 
FODLPDQW¶VH[WUD-marital affair, the court stressed that such restrictions must be proportionate to the 
OHJLWLPDWHDLPSXUVXHG5HVWULFWLQJEH\RQGWKLVZRXOGKDYHµWKHZKROO\XQGHVLUDEOHFKLOOLQg effect on 
the necessary ability of publishers to sell their newspapers.  We have to enable sales if we want to 
NHHSRXUQHZVSDSHUV¶192  (OVHZKHUH7XJHQGKDW-¶VSpelman judgment featured extracts of a defence 
witness statement from Mr Morgan, Editor of the Daily Star.  Mr Morgan denied financial motives for 
contesting the injunction, before referring to such pressures on press in the following terms: 
µ([FOXVLYH VWRULHV DUH WKH YHU\ OLIHEORRG RI WKH 6XQGD\ SUHVV  7KH FRPPHUFLDO LPSHUDWLYH RI WKH
exclusive VKRXOGQRWEHXQGHUHVWLPDWHGDWDWLPHZKHQ%ULWDLQ¶VQHZVSDSHUVDUHILJKWLQJIRUWKHLUYHU\
VXUYLYDO¶193   More recently in Weller v Associated Newspapers, WKH0DLO2QOLQH(GLWRU¶VHYLGHQFH
emphasised the tough commercial market faced even by internet-based publishers.194  Despite the 
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0DLO¶V DSSDUHQW UXGH KHDOWK DV WKH PRVW YLVLWHG QHZVSDSHU ZHEVLWH LQ WKH ZRUOG WKLV FODLP ZDV
accepted by Dingemans J.195  All of these comments acknowledge the importance of sales to 
newspapers, and are couched in high stakes terms; the very existence of papers in general depends on 
their profitability.  Sales equal survival.196 
 
In turn, as acknowledged in Goodwin, newspaper sales are reliant on attracting and interesting the 
consuming public.  Here Tugendhat J quoted a passage cited earlier in Donald v Ntuli.197 It states:     
 
µ$UHTXLUHPHQWWRUHSRUW«LQVRPHDXVWHUHDEVWUDFWIRUPGHYRLGRIPXFKRILWV
human interest, could well mean that the report would not be read and the 
information would not be passed on.  Ultimately, such an approach could threaten 
the viability of newspapers and magazines, which can only inform the public if 
WKH\DWWUDFWHQRXJKUHDGHUVDQGPDNHHQRXJKPRQH\WRVXUYLYH¶198  
 
Tugendhat J used this passage to support his claim that the naPH DQG MRE WLWOH RI )UHG *RRGZLQ¶V
PLVWUHVV ZHUH LPSRUWDQW SDUWV RI WKH GHIHQGDQW¶V SURSRVHG VWRU\199  Yet it acknowledges that such 
restrictions may hinder reporting and make it difficult for papers to attract and engage readers in order 
to profit.  The link between interesting the public and commercial sales was also acknowledged in 
Weller.200   
 
Elsewhere, the select committee on privacy and injunctions has expressed the view that frivolous 
content is necessary to maintaining readers:   
 
µ)HZ QHZVSDSHUV FRQVLVW VROHO\ RI serious news stories.  Most of them rely, to 
varying degrees, on some form of light-hearted reportage or gossip.  It may not be 
easy to present a clear explanation as to why such articles are of themselves in the 
public interest, but it can be argued that without them readership of newspapers 
would decline HYHQIXUWKHU¶201  
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All of these statements involve the uncontroversial proposition that newspapers must interest the 
SXEOLF WRPDLQWDLQ VDOHV  ,Q HVVHQFH µLQWHUHVWLQJ WKHSXEOLF¶GLUHFWO\ FRUUHVSRQGVZLWK WKHPHGLD¶V
commercial interests, and this is the case as long as the press operates in a free market system; 
µLQWHUHVWLQJ WKH SXEOLF¶ thus represents commercial realities.  Media/privacy discourse does not 
expressly claim that gossip and titillation is the only form of expression that FDQµLQWHUHVWWKHSXEOLF¶
though it certainly does not offer any alternative examples of material that may do so.  It is also 
pertinent that the public interest maxim has been repeatedly deployed in this specific context; it is 
clearly viewed by judges as particularly apt to the tabloid material disputed in these cases.  
Furthermore, MPI discourse does overwhelmingly characterise expression within the µLQWHUHVWLQJWKH
SXEOLF¶ category as tittle-tattle and scandal.  For example, tKHWULYLDOFHOHEULW\QDWXUHRIµLQWHUHVWLQJWR
WKHSXEOLF¶H[SUHVVLRQLVLPSOLFLWLQWKHVHOHFWFRPPLWWHHFRPPHQWVDQG3URIXPRH[DPSOHVRutlined 
above202 and, significantly, in the widespread legal recognition that private information is a lucrative 
commodity per se.  The most KLJKSURILOHUHFRJQLWLRQ WKDW WKHSHUVRQDORUµWULYLDO¶ LVVLJQLILFDQWLQ
economic terms) is in Council of Europe Resolution 1165 which stated:  
 
µSHUVRQDO SULYDF\ LV RIWHQ LQYDGHG « DV SHRSOH¶V SULYDWH OLYHV KDYH EHFRPH D
highly lucrative commodity for certain sections of the media.  The victims are 
essentially public figures, since details of their private lives serve as a stimulus to 
VDOHV¶203 
 
This resolution has been widely cited at national204  and European level.205  It confirms that one (or 
perhaps the) key driver of intrusive publications is the commercial value of stories revealing private 
information.206  But private information can only be a lucrative commodity because large sections of 
the public (or market) are willing to pay for it.  Thus, the very presence of this rationale highlights a 
FRQWUDGLFWLRQ DFURVV 03, FDVHODZ UHDVRQLQJ  7KH FRXUWV GHSLFW WDEORLG UHDGHUV DV µa certain¶
readership, a narrow group not broadly representative of the wider populace.  Yet the passages 
discussed here indicate the consuming µpublic¶RUFRQVXPHUEDVHIRU gossip and trivia is far larger in 
size than this terminology suggests.    
 
In short, a commercial context narrative is woven throughout MPI caselaw and related literature.  The 
QHZVSDSHULQGXVWU\¶VFRPPHUFLDOYLDELOLW\GHSHQGVRQVDOHVZKLFKLQWXUQGHSHQGRQLQWHUHVWLQJWKH
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SXEOLF 3ULYDWH LQIRUPDWLRQ VSHFLILFDOO\RI WKHµNLVVDQG WHOO¶YDUiety in MPI disputes, interests the 
public and JHQHUDWHV VDOHV  ,Q WKLV VHQVH µLQWHUHVWLQJ WKH SXEOLF¶ GLUHFWO\ FRUUHVSRQGV ZLWK PHGLD
commercial interests and represents commercial realities.  As Part 4.2 argues, such issues prove to 
have a significant bearing on the separability of the opposing concepts in the public interest 
dichotomy. 
 
 
[4] Deconstructing the public interest dichotomyDµFULVLVRIYHUVXV¶" 
 
 
A deconstructive reading of MPI caselaw has revealed that the Art 8/10 balance is heavily influenced 
by a prominent binary opposition that routinely privileges H[SUHVVLRQLQWKHµSXEOLFLQWHUHVW¶RYHUDQG
DERYHH[SUHVVLRQWKDWPHUHO\µLQWHUHVWVWKHSXEOLF¶.  This part undertakes deconstructive analysis and 
considers to what extent are these two concepts stable, distinct or mutually reliant?  What discreet 
rhetorical or ideological dynamics may operate behind them?   
 
 
4.1 Subjectivity and the Dichotomy   
 
Within the Art 8/10 balancing exercise, public interest versus interesting the public represents a vital 
µD[LVDURXQGZKLFKFRQIOLFWLQJOHJDODUJXPHQWDWLRQLVEXLOW¶207  Each concept represents an alternative 
mode of expression.  A range of judicial statements in MPI caselaw indicate that expression in the 
public interest has a serious, earnest quality; it has a political content, or taps into political or social 
LVVXHVWKDWOHQGWKHH[SUHVVLRQDJUDYLW\RUZLGHULPSRUWDQFHµ7KHWHVWUHTXLUHGWRMXVWLI\SXEOLFDWLRQ
LVDKLJKRQH³exceptional SXEOLFLQWHUHVW´¶208  Furthermore, numerous cases confirm that this high 
benchmark will be gauged objectively.209  Therefore, impartial judges are naturally best placed to 
make such an assessment and ZLOOKDYHWKHµILQDOVD\¶RQSXEOLFLQWHUHVW210   
 
Whilst public interest expression is characterised as exceptional, significant and objective etc., 
expression that interests the public is correspondingly characterised dismissively as trivial, frivolous 
and salacious.  Yet, numerous MPI decisions do not necessarily corroborate such clean cut judicial 
characterisations of each category.  It seems that understandings of public interest rest upon abstract 
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distinctions that are arguably tenuous, particularly at their borders.  At its core, the public interest rests 
upon a basic distinction between significant/trivial or important/unimportant expression.  The most 
influential factor determining whether expression is significant or trivial is whether or not it pertains 
to the political.  But if one acknowledges the political, the moral and the social as fundamentally 
entwined, the political/non-political distinction is brought into question.  This ambiguity is 
VXSSOHPHQWHGDQGFRPSOLFDWHGE\WKHLVVXHRIZKHWKHUµHQWHUWDLQLQJ¶VSHHFKPXVWEHDVVLJQHGWRWKH
trivial, as British caselaw tends to assume, or whether it can provide a crucial means of facilitating 
significant political, moral or social debate.  This latter point appears reliant upon tenuous 
VSHFXODWLRQVDERXWWDEORLGUHDGHUV¶LQWHUDFWLRQVZLWKVXFKPDWHULDODUHWKH\GULYHQE\EDVHSUXULHQW
morbid motivations, or is their engagement more profound, shrewd or thoughtful? 
 
As caselaw demonstrates, such ambiguities have implications for the conclusive categorisation of a 
PHGLDGHIHQGDQW¶VVSHHFKas ZLWKLQRUEH\RQGWKHµSXEOLFLQWHUHVW¶SDUWLFXODUO\LQPDUJLQDOFDVHV)RU
example, the disputed material in Spelman and McClaren could logically have been situated in the 
DOWHUQDWLYH µLQWHUHVWLQJ WR WKHSXEOLF¶FDWHJRU\EHFDXVH LWVZLGHU VLJQLILFDQFHRU relevance to debate 
was, itself, eminently debatable.  But a similar subjectivity of treatment is arguably present at the core 
of public interest, as demonstrated in Ferdinand and Campbell, both of which permitted limited 
publication revealing that the public had been misled, albeit about personal and (it could be said) 
relatively trivial matters.  Defensible though these decisions may be, they do not necessarily 
FRPIRUWDEO\ FRUUHVSRQG ZLWK WKH µH[FHSWLRQDO¶ REMHFWLYH µVLJQLILFDQW¶ WHUPLQRORJ\ ZLWK ZKLFK the 
public interest category has been depicted. 
 
Within MPI the public interest concept unavoidably entails the compartmentalisation of stories (or 
fragments of them).  But the process of distinguishing categories of information, gauging their wider 
benefits and assigning them respective values in a given case is unavoidably subjective and thus beset 
by indeterminacy.  As Fish claims,  
 
µDOWKRXJKWKHFDWHJRU\LVRIIHUHGDVDZD\RIPDUNLQJRIIGLVFRXUVHUHODWHGWRWKH
workings of democracy from discourse of merely personal (and hence regulatable) 
concern, its own boundaries shift in relation to the success various private groups 
have in gHWWLQJWKHLUFRQFHUQVODEHOOHG³SXEOLF´ or ³SULYDWH´¶211 
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4.2 Conflation or survival? Commercial factors in the balancing exercise 
 
The tenuity of the public interest dichotomy is further demonstrated by a recurring issue facing the 
courts at balancing stage, namely whether (and how) commercial demands upon the press should be 
factored into the balancing process.  The courts face a dichotomous choice to either include or exclude 
such pressures, each of which entails specific difficulties.   Including commercial factors as relevant is 
problematic because it involves a confusion of µpublic interest¶ and µinteresting the public¶ that 
Leveson,212 a range of judges213 and commentators214 have criticised.  It entails a conflation because, 
Part 3.2 established, commercial factors are intrinsically based upon and DOOLHG WR µinteresting the 
public¶, which is understood in this context as trivia.  Including commercial factors in the Art 8/10 
balancing exercise thus indirectly imports traces of µinteresting the public¶, with all the negative 
implications for privacy that such a conflation brings.215 
 
Yet completely excluding commercial factors is also problematic because, according to judicial 
reasoning outlined earlier, if newspapers in general are no longer commercially viable, their very 
survival is at stake and with it (by implication) the crucial public interest-watchdog function.  A 
parliamentary select committee report summarised this rationale thus:  
 
µAs gossip in newspapers can help sales and thus enable journalism to continue to 
perform its essential role in a democracy, it might follow that the commercial 
viability of the press should be a factor when balancing the public interest in a 
VWRU\ DJDLQVW DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V ULJKW WR SULYDF\  ,I QHZVSDSHUV GR QRW H[LVW WKH\
cannot report on issues obviously in the public interest¶216  
 
This argument was supported by evidence provided to the committee by the Chartered Institute for 
Journalists which argued that commercial LVVXHVZHUHUHOHYDQWWRWKHµSXEOLF LQWHUHVW¶ µbecause good 
LQYHVWLJDWLYHMRXUQDOLVPLVH[SHQVLYHDQGKDVWREHIXQGHGVRPHZD\´«7KHSUess therefore relied 
RQ UHYHQXHV IURP VDOHV DQG DGYHUWLVLQJ ZKLFK UHTXLUHG WKH ZLGHVW SRVVLEOH FLUFXODWLRQ¶217  Yet 
Leveson questions this line of reasoning which justifies meeting public demand in order to support the 
press in its crucial watchdog role.  He claims this is simply a more subtle version of the argument that 
µZKDWHYHU VHOOV QHZVSDSHUV PXVW LSVR IDFWR EH D JRRG WKLQJ VLQFH QHZVSDSHUV DUH D JRRG WKLQJ in 
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WKHPVHOYHV¶%XWERWK arguments DUHµIDOODFLRXV¶EHFDXVHWKH\erroneously assume that because press 
freedom is good, press choices governed by commercial self-interest are also good.218  Other 
commentators have criticised the lack of evidence supporting this µeconomic survival¶ argument.219   
 
In the early case of Flitcroft the Court of Appeal included commercial factors in its Art 8/10 
reasoning, Lord Woolf CJ stating: 
 
µThe courts must not ignore the fact that if newspapers do not publish information 
which the public are interested in, there will be fewer newspapers published, 
which will not be in the public interest¶220   
 
According to this rationale, there is a public interest in more newspapers.  Interestingly, commercial 
sales are implicitly presented KHUHLQWHUPVRIµLQWHUHVWLQJWKHSXEOLF¶.  Its reasoning runs: commercial 
sales are necessary to ensure a higher quantity of newspapers generally, and this is in the public 
interest.  As such, it ties commercial factors concerning the newspaper industry to public interest.  
However, /RUG:RROI¶VSRLQWwas later criticised by the Court of Appeal in McKennitt as difficult to 
reconcile with the influential maxim (or µORQJ-VWDQGLQJ YLHZ¶ WKDW ZKDW LQWHUHVWV WKH SXEOLF LV QRW
necessarily in the public interest;221  the Flitcroft court had failed to distinguish between the two and 
these aspects of its decision were subsequently discredited. 
 
Yet three recent cases have tentatively returned to considering commercial factors, albeit in more 
subtle terms than the Flitcroft rationale.  They were referred to in Hutcheson where the Court of 
Appeal refused to grant an injunction that would prevent publication of the fact that the claimant had a 
second family.  In the leading judgment Gross LJ said: 
 
µIRUVHFWLRQVRIWKHPHGLDGHYHORSPHQWVLQSULYDF\ODZ«PD\QRWRQO\JLYHULVH
to issues of principle as to IUHHGRPRIH[SUHVVLRQ«EXWDOVRWRUHDOcommercial 
concerns ± which at least to the extent of the general public interest in having a 
thriving and vigorous newspaper industry, representing all legitimate opinions, 
may also be argued to give rise to a relevant factor for the court to take into 
account.¶222  
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Dingemans J echoed this rationale in Weller UHIHUULQJ WR µWKH JHQHUDO LQWHUHVW¶ LQ µD YLJRURXV DQG
IORXULVKLQJQHZVSDSHULQGXVWU\¶.223  The proposition that there is a general public interest in having a 
vigorous and diverse press is slightly more sophisticated than the Flitcroft rationale because it nods to 
pluralism, a concept that features in other Art 10-related caselaw.224  But it is, despite appearances, a 
very similar proposition to Flitcroft.  Crucially, both focus on commercial health of the newspaper 
industry generally and link such issues to public interest arguments that benefit individual newspaper 
defendants within that industry.  The Hutcheson rationale takes a slightly different route as it runs: 
commercial sales contribute to a greater range of newspapers generally, and this is in public interest.  
It thus emphasises the qualitative industry-wide benefits (diversity, pluralism) that commercial sales 
generate, notwithstanding the low quality of the specific defendant newspaper¶s disputed story.  It 
suggests that even low quality tabloid expression with a commercial value contributes to a public 
interest by virtue of its contribution to a diverse newspaper industry.  Either way, both the Flitcroft 
and Hutcheson rationales intrinsically ally commercial health to a newspaper industry in the public 
interest (either per se, or because of its diversity).  In Hutcheson the courts cast commercial factors in 
prima facie more rights-compatible terms, but it is questionable whether this fully avoids the 
conflation of public interest/interesting the public that Flitcroft was criticised for.   
 
It should be noted that in Hutcheson, Gross LJ stated only that the public interest in a thriving 
newspaper industry may be a relevant factor for the court to consider.  The extract does not commit to 
whether this factor will routinely feature in MPI caselaw where most defendants are newspapers.  
Indeed, Gross LJ¶VMXGJPHQW did not even clearly state whether this was included as a relevant factor 
in the Hutcheson case itself.  *URVV/-¶Vpassage was later quoted by Davies J in AAA v Associated 
News.225  Here the claimant failed to obtain an injunction prohibiting publication of information that 
might lead to her identification as the µLOOHJLWLPDWH¶child of Boris Johnson.  TKHFODLPDQW¶VFDVHIDLOHG 
partly because public interest issues supported publication.226  Specifically, the fact that the claimant 
ZDV-RKQVRQ¶VVHFRQGµlove-FKLOG¶VXJJHVWHGa recklessness of character that ZDVµUHOHYDQW>WR@ERWK
KLV SULYDWH DQG SURIHVVLRQDO FKDUDFWHU LQ SDUWLFXODU KLV ILWQHVV IRU SXEOLF RIILFH¶227 a finding later 
upheld by the Court of Appeal.228  After quoting Gross LJ¶s comments regarding the relevance of 
commercial factors, Davies J stated:  
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µfurther facts may be legitimately included to illustrate points made in a way 
which captures the attention of readers.  The engagePHQW RI UHDGHUV¶ LQWHUHVW LV
important, the commercial imperative to sell newspapers is a relevant factor to be 
taken into account when conducting the art 8/10 balancing exercise¶229   
 
Though Davies J was more certain about the relevance of commercial factors to the balancing 
exercise, the factor still played a peripheral role and its approximate weighting was not articulated.  
From these authorities it is difficult to ascertain whether commercial pressures have been re-imported 
LQWR WKH EDODQFLQJ H[HUFLVH RU VLPSO\ µDGGHG LQWR WKH VFDOHV¶ WR SURYLGH DGGLWLRQDO JHQHUDO VXSSRUW
once the defendant-favoured decision has been reached.  But either way, commercial factors are 
clearly potentialO\SUHVHQWDQGZLWKWKHPWUDFHVRIµLQWHUHVWLQJWKHSXEOLF¶ 
 
3XEOLFLQWHUHVWDQGLQWHUHVWLQJWKHSXEOLFZKDW¶VWKH différance? 
  
7KHFRXUWV¶GLIILFXOWLHVLQGHFLGLQJZKHWKHUWRLQFOXGHRUH[FOXGHFRPPHUFLDOIDFWRUVLQWKH$UW
balancing exercise reflect a certain intermittent mutual reliance of concepts within the public interest 
binary opposition.  MPI caselaw repeatedly stresses that the free press is vital to a functioning 
democracy.  But its public interest-watchdog role is clearly reliant upon its existence, which is in turn 
is reliant upon maintaining sales.  In this sense, public interest is at least partly reliant upon 
µLQWHUHVWLQJ WR SXEOLF¶ WKH QREOH LGHDO XSRQ FRPPHUFLDO UHDOLWLHV  $FFRUGLQJ WR 03, GLVFRXUVH
µLQWHUHVWLQJWRWKHSXEOLF¶VXpplements that which is lacking in the dominant public interest concept; 
specifically, it reaches out to the public, which it is assumed public interest per se does not or cannot 
do. In engaging the public it generates essential profit in the market economy ± the trivial is 
(economically) significant and in strict financial terms it dominates the public interest.  The very 
commercial existence of the newspaper industry, including by implication its public interest 
reportage, is deemed dependent upon interesting the public, which in this context is depicted as trivia 
and scandal.  In turn, the public interest concept has been used as a vehicle for commercial health 
DUJXPHQWV ZKLFK DUH LQWULQVLFDOO\ DOOLHG WR µLQWHUHVWLQJ WKH SXEOLF¶  &RXUWV KDYH RFFDVLRQDOO\ 
acknowledged an additional, alternative public interest in the wider quantitative or qualitative benefits 
of a commercially healthy newspaper industry. 
 
So despite criticising the media for merging or confusing them, judges too have struggled at times to 
maintain a clear, coherent distinction between public interest and interesting the public; this arguably 
UHSUHVHQWV DQ LQVWDQFH RI WKH µFULVLV RI YHUVXV¶ 'HUULGD LGHQWLILHV  /LNH VR PDQ\ RWKHU GXDOLVPV
µSXEOLFLQWHUHVW¶YHUVXVµLQWHUHVWLQJ WKHSXEOLF¶SUoves to be a crude distinction, beset by limitations 
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DQG FRQWUDGLFWLRQV  3DUWLFXODUO\ SUREOHPDWLF LV LWV WHQGHQF\ WR VLPSOLI\ WKH FRXUWV¶ WUHDWPHQW RI
different modes of expression, leading them to view what are complex qualitative assessments of 
expression in somewhat reductive terms.  The related narratives that cluster around this dichotomy are 
similarly simplistic and warrant further discussion. 
 
 
4.3 The sKLIWLQJµSXEOLF¶LQMPI 
 
The public interest dichotomy does not simply rest upon a fundamental distinction between the innate 
value of high and low culture.230  Each concept also entails its own wider model of the public, media 
and society in which they operate.  The account of public interest in Part 3.1 revealed the extent to 
which it is ultimately premised upon a particular view, a particular set of assumptions about the 
µSXEOLF¶  ,Q WKLV FDWHJRU\ WKH SXEOLF LV FRPSULVHG RI D KLJKO\ LGHDOLVHG FROOHFWLRQ RI WKRXJKWIXO
intelligent citizens, each politically engaged and actively participating in public life and the task of 
self-government.  Such Enlightenment-era ideals are particularly patent in the dominant democratic 
MXVWLILFDWLRQV RI %RUN DQG 0HLNOHMRKQ EXW DOVR FOHDUO\ XQGHUSLQ 0LOO¶V ZRUN ZKLFK DFFRUGLQJ Wo 
%DUHQGW µDVVXPHV « D OLYHO\ GLVFXVVLRQ RI ULYDO YLHZV DV LI VRFLHW\ ZHUH FRQGXFWLQJ D SHUSHWXDO
VHPLQDU¶231  These notions influence judicial comments regarding the public interest, particularly the 
democratic debate ground.  In contrast, the public that consumes trivia is a small group of juvenile, 
puerile individuals as opposed to the engaged, debating, public-VSLULWHGFLWL]HQVRI µSXEOLF LQWHUHVW¶
The media correspondingly acts as either interrogative watchdog or cynical, self-interested trash-
peddlers according to the category.  So, corresponding to each notion in the dualism we see two 
RSSRVLQJQDUUDWLYHVFRQVWUXFWHGµ3XEOLFLQWHUHVW¶LVWKHSULYLOHJHGQDUUDWLYHEDVHGXSRQDQLGHDORI
how things ought to be, and the other ±µLQWHUHVWLQJWKHSXEOLF¶± seems to represent a grubby reality, 
or how things are.  Yet, ironically, this latter narrative also acknowledges the lucrative nature of trivial 
expression upon which the commercial viability of newspapers apparently depends. 
 
The striking thing that emerges from deconstructing 03,FDVHODZLVWKDWWKHFRQFHSWRIµSXEOLF¶DFURVV
MXGJPHQWVLVFHUWDLQO\QRWFRQVLVWHQWVWDEOHRUFRKHUHQW,QVWHDGWKHVLJQµSXEOLF¶UHSUHVHQWVDVHULHV
of constructs employed by various parties for their own rhetorical purposes.  It is not the aim of this 
DUWLFOH WRSXW IRUZDUGDQDOWHUQDWLYHRU µFRUUHFW¶ DFFRXQWRI WKH µSXEOLF¶, but to understand how the 
µSXEOLF¶ LV FRQVWUXFWHG E\ WKH YDULRXV SDUWLHV ZKR GHSOR\ LW WR Ddvance their own private or 
institutional agendas in MPI discourse.  AdoptLQJWKHWHUPµSXEOLF¶bolsters their respective arguments 
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by adding an air of legitimacy; it draws upon cherished democratic aims and values, clearly indicating 
µZH, and only we, truly VSHDNIRUWKHSXEOLF¶   
 
1XPHURXVµSXEOLFV¶RI fluctuating sizes and natures crop up in different contexts in MPI discourse.  
)LUVWWKHUHLVWKHµSXEOLF¶XVHGE\ the media in its self-justifying rhetoric.  This public is essentially 
the market of consumers who will only buy what interests them and whose demands must be met if 
papers are to survive ± the very existence of the press depends on it.  In this narrative, the consumers 
are empowered, in charge, and papers are merely giving them what they want; doing so is essential to 
their watchdog function.  Though as Fiss notes, µ7REHDFRQVXPHUHYHQDVRYHUHLJQRQHLVQRWWREH
DFLWL]HQ¶232  Second, is the more subtle depiction of µSXEOLF¶LQWKHMXVWLILFDWLRQVIRUIUHHH[SUHVVLRQ
that underpin this area.  It is clear that the dominant justifications concerning democratic debate and 
truth rest upon Enlightenment-HUD LGHDOV ZKHUH WKH µSXEOLF¶ LV D PRQROLWKLF HQWLW\ FRPSULVHG RI D
homogenous group of politically engaged, intelligent citizens, always keen to debate serious social 
issues.  These members of the public reflect the contradictory co-existence of noble ideals and elitist 
assumptions.  And finally, despite their claims, judges are no more immune than others to this 
tendency to co-RSWWKHµSXEOLF¶IRUWKHLURZQUKHWRULFDOSXUSRVHV  Whilst critical of the media for self-
interestedly conflating public interest and interesting the public, other judicial comments betray 
certain preconceptions of their own regarding the public.  Their evident (and justifiable) distaste for 
much of the rHSRUWDJH LQ03,GLVSXWHVRQRFFDVLRQWLOWVRYHULQWRDFDULFDWXUHRIWKHµSXEOLF¶ RUµa 
SXEOLF¶ WKDW FRQVXPHV LW  7KLV SXEOLF LV LPSOLFLWO\ FKDUDFWHULVHG DV a voyeuristic, licentious mob, 
LURQLFDOO\ HFKRLQJ WKH *UHHN RULJLQV RI WKH ZRUG µGHPRFUDF\¶ ZKLFh meant rule of the people 
µGHPRV¶ EXW ZLWK FRQQRWDWLRQV RI WKH XQUXO\ PXOWLWXGH  This arguably gives the impression of a 
well-LQWHQWLRQHGSDWHUQDOLVWHOLWHUHLQIRUFLQJFHUWDLQVWHUHRW\SHVDERXWWKHSXEOLFDQGZKDWµLQWHUHVWV¶
it) whilst drawing upon specific Enlightenment-HUDOLEHUDOLGHDOVRIZKDWLVWUXO\IRUWKHSXEOLF¶VRZQ
good.  This is evidenced by judicial use of the Profumo example which is underpinned by the 
somewhat patronising assumption that though the public has a general right to information regarding 
serious, weighty political matters, it will not be interested unless a little titillation also features.   
 
Perry warns that judicial moral-political orthodoxies could be hidden within value assessments of 
expression.233  And whilst firmly supportive of stronger press regulation, even Wacks concedes that 
WKH SXEOLF LQWHUHVW FRQFHSW LV SUREOHPDWLF LQ WKDW µ,W FDVWV DV PRUDO JXDUGLDQV WKRVH FKDUJHG ZLWK
DVVHVVLQJWKHPHULWVRISXEOLFDWLRQ¶DQGWKHUHIRUHFDQQRWEHREMHFWLYH234  The evidence from caselaw 
suggests that such concerns are not misplaced.  Across the above H[DPSOHV WKH µSXEOLF¶ LV
characterised in contradictory, disparate terms, sometimes idealised, sometimes denigrated.  It is 
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subjected to shifting depictions for rhetorical effect, marshalled to and fro to serve rhetorical ends.  In 
this way, both oppositions in the dichotomy entail certain assumptions about the public.  Yet crucially 
ZHDUHHDFKRIXVERWKQRQHDQGDOORIWKHVHµSXEOLFV¶ 
 
These observations bring to mind /RUG/HYHVRQ¶V discussion of the press and the public interest.  His 
report explained WKDW SXEOLF LQWHUHVW DQG IUHHGRP RI H[SUHVVLRQ DUH µSRZHUIXO DQG LPSRUWDQW
FRQFHSWV¶WKDWPXVWEHXVHGZLWKµFODULW\DQGFDUH¶ 
 
µThey are concepts which are capable of being, and have been, used both 
rhetorically and analytically to explain and support a range of perspectives, 
arguments and conclusions¶235 
   
The implication of this statement, borne out over the course of his subsequent investigation, is that 
press use of WKHWHUPµSXEOLFLQWHUHVW¶LVVHOI-MXVWLI\LQJUKHWRULFLQFRQWUDVWWRWKHµSURSHU¶µDQDO\WLFDO¶
understanding of the kind preferred by judges and Leveson.  Yet this deconstructive analysis suggests 
WKDWDFRQFHSWVXFKDVµSXEOLF LQterest¶ LV laden with ideological assumptions and is thus inherently 
DQGXQDYRLGDEO\UKHWRULFDOHYHQZKHQGHSOR\HGµDQDO\WLFDOO\¶  In Fish¶s terms, µLW LVLGHRORJ\DQG
SROLWLFV DOO WKH ZD\ GRZQ¶.236  Judges in particular could perhaps be more attuned to the innate 
limitations of this central concept in MPI discourse. 
 
'HFRQVWUXFWLRQ¶VQDWXUDOµDOOLDQFHZLWKXQGHUGRJ¶which in this binary opposition LVµLQWHUHVWLQJWKH
SXEOLF¶ PLJKW XOWLPDWHO\ DQG SUREOHPDWLFDOO\ KDYH OHG WR D SUHIHUHQFLQJ RI WKH *ROLDWK media 
corporations in these cases.  But this potential paradox of applying deconstruction to the Art 8/10 
EDODQFLQJH[HUFLVHGRHVQRWDULVHEHFDXVHDGLIIHUHQWPDUJLQDOLVHGµRWKHU¶KDVHPHUJHGWKHµSXEOLF¶
Though it plays a central role in MPI caselaw, in every other respect WKHµSXEOLF¶LVPDUJLQDOLVHGLQ
this reasoning.  For example, the disputes themselves primarily arise between different sections of a 
wealthy elite, namely high-profile public figures and the press.237  Furthermore, caselaw stresses that 
judges must determine the public interest, whilst editors decide what interests the public, begging the 
question: what is left for the public to decide?  In short, MPI litigation takes place between elites, and 
is arbitrated by a legal elite according tR FRQFHSWV ZKLFK FDOO XSRQ WKH µSXEOLF¶ EXW LQ ZKLFK WKH
µSXEOLF¶VHHP to have little, if any, stake.238  Ultimately, the notion of public interest does not live up 
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to the ideals its rhetoric extols.  7KLVPDUJLQDOLVDWLRQRIWKHµSXEOLF¶LVLURQLFLQOLJKWof the claimed 
democratic justifications that underpin this area.239  MPI caselaw has faced arguably unjustifiable 
accusations that privacy protection is being expanded at the whim of unaccountable, undemocratic 
judges.240  Reliance on the one-dimensional depictions inherent in this binary opposition does not 
dispel such accusations.  Such language, and the mind-set it reflects, should be reconsidered if people 
are to feel that they (we) have a stake in human rights discourse. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
DeconsWUXFWLRQ¶V WHQGHQF\ WRZDUGV WKH HTXLYRFDO GRHV QRW OHQG LWVHOI WR FRQYHQLHQW FRQFUHWH
conclusions or recommendations IRU SUDFWLFDO UHIRUP  ,QVWHDG DV WKLV DUWLFOH KDV VKRZQ µWKH
conclusions deconstructive readings reach are frequently claims about structures of language, 
operations of rhetoric, and convolutions of thought¶.241  Deconstructing MPI caselaw has revealed 
various insights of this nature. 
 
The HRA Art 8/10 framework, primarily composed of floating signifiers, effectively defers conflict to 
an abstract-level, judge-PDGHELQDU\RSSRVLWLRQEDVHGDURXQGWKHFRQFHSWRIµSXEOLFLQWHUHVW¶$WWKLV
stage the operation and influence of hierarchy in the balancing exercise becomes apparent.  The 
SUHIHUHQFLQJRIµSXEOLFLQWHUHVW¶RYHUµLQWHUHVWLQJWKHSXEOLF¶LVLQIRUPHGE\DFOXVWHURILGHDOVWURSHV
and narrative constructs based around a civic-minded, politically-engaged citizenry reading the 
serious, objective reportage of a progressive, interrogative press that protects and serves it.  The 
µSXEOLF LQWHUHVW¶ FDWHJRU\ DQG ZKDW LW UHSUHVHQWV LV GLVWLQJXLVKHG IURP DQG SULYLOHJHG RYHU
µLQWHUHVWLQJWKHSXEOLF¶7KLVLQWXUQLVUXGLPHQWDULO\characterised as frivolous, salacious content that 
provides mere entertainment for the prying, prurient, even indolent and thoughtless.  Whatever the 
virtues of MPI doctrine, it is difficult not to conclude that a residue of culturally-specific assumptions 
is sedimented within this crucial concept 
 
It seems that the issues surrounding media privacy disputes are more complex and nuanced than the 
balancing exercise and its key binary opposition are able to represent.  Most significantly, they are 
simply unable to directly confront a host of difficulties concerning the role of commercial factors in 
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such decisions.  For example, how to accommodate tensions between culturally specific 
Enlightenment ideals of civic participation, debate etc. and modern commercial imperatives that 
simultaneously support and obstruct the press in furthering these values.  Or the derivative question of 
whether the press simply meets public µdemand¶ for trivia, or plays a more complex role in also 
stimulating that µdemand¶.242  In short, how to contend with the core contradiction of ensuring the 
very survival of newspapers (or rather, their watchdog function) in a capitalist economy, whilst 
curbing their freedom to publish the intrusive, low-quality but high-value content that they claim is 
essential for this survival.  These questions are arguably situated beyond the self-imposed boundaries 
of DGMXGLFDWLRQ<HWWKH\IHHGLQWROHJDODUJXPHQWIRXQGHGRQWKHµSXEOLFLQWHUHVW¶GLFKRWRP\$QG
they demonstrate that this dualism is a crude instrument which struggles under the burden of such 
issues.  A clear distinFWLRQ EHWZHHQ µSXEOLF LQWHUHVW¶µLQWHUHVWLQJ WKH SXEOLF¶ cannot always be 
maintained.  Instead, doctrine fluctuates between the two poles, privileging public interest expression 
whilst stressing the importance of maintaining press readership in harsh commercial climates.  In 
doing so it suppoUWV &XOOHU¶V FODLP WKDW µOHJDO GRFWULQH DQG DUJXPHQW DUH DWWHPSWV WR SDSHU RYHU
FRQWUDGLFWLRQVZKLFKQRQHWKHOHVVUHDVVHUWWKHPVHOYHV¶243 
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